


July 26, 1982

Mr. Ken Follett



Dear Mr. Follett,

I enjoyed your July 6 letter, and hearing about your forthcoming book. You don't need another reader, do you? I'd love to see a copy.

Re your question on the desertion figures: Of course all figures during this period are suspect--for one instance, what's desertion and what's disaffection? In my case, the sentences you ~~quote~~ quote don't truly reflect the up-and-down, roller-coaster effect of attitudes in the final months. Charlie Naas and I have discussed the problem of figures, and are pretty much agreed that, regardless of which numbers one uses, the following is true:

1. Desertions ~~increased~~ increased slightly after the Jaleh Square riots (Sept. 8), and fluctuated from then until ~~the~~ December, when they took a sharp turn up, then eased back. After the Shah's departure, desertions increased dramatically, and the rate approached 20 per cent as the Ayatollah arrived Feb. 1.
2. Total number of desertions and those so disaffected they could not function was somewhere between 15 and ~~20~~ 30 per cent of the active forces by the Feb. 10 takeover.
3. The key units in the capital remained loyal almost until the end, though there ~~was~~ was serious disaffection from late Dec. on. Senior Generals say they were unsure whether, or which way, the army would shoot from the first of the year onwards into 1979. Other units would go over to the revolutionaries intact (were these considered deserters?)

The way I'd handle it is to draw on the above, and say something like "desertions and defections were up, and the army gradually lost its cohesiveness. By the time of Khomeini's accession to power, somewhere between 15 and 30 per cent of the Army had either deserted or gone over to the revolutionaries."

Within that kind of framework, both Charlie and I are "certain" that the figures are right."

Sincerely,

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