
MARYLAND

Maryland's attenuated shape reflects the fact that this is one of the most diverse states. Although it ranks only 42d in area, you can drive 350 miles wholly within its boundaries. In that distance you move from the south-of-the-Mason-Dixon-Line Eastern Shore, through the booming suburbs (and some declining ones) of Baltimore and Washington, and up into the Appalachian Mountains. Tiny Maryland has just about every kind of people — northerners and southerners, blacks and ethnics, civil servants and Chesapeake Bay watermen, almost all the diversity of the entire United States compressed into one small package.

The very diversity of this state has made it difficult to maintain a single identity. It was more successful in so doing 50 years ago, when H. L. Mencken was extolling the virtues of the pleasant life of his native city in the *Baltimore Sun*. Maryland was then a kind of city-state: 49% of its residents lived in the closely packed, rowhouse-lined streets of Baltimore, with most of the rest spread in two diverse hinterlands, the southern-oriented counties on both shores of Chesapeake Bay and the northern-accented wheat-growing country around the antique small cities of Frederick and Hagerstown and the mountain-bound industrial city of Cumberland. Maryland was then a place tolerant of its regional eccentricities: Prohibition was enforced only laxly in Baltimore; the state's old law guaranteeing blacks equal access to public accommodations specifically excluded the Eastern Shore.

Today Maryland is quite different. Only 19% of its people live in the city of Baltimore, and the Eastern Shore and western counties include a much smaller percentage of the state's population than they did 50 years ago. Most Marylanders now live in suburban communities, 52% in suburban counties around Baltimore and 29% in the two suburban counties around Washington, D.C. Just 40 miles apart, these two metropolitan areas could hardly be more different. Baltimore is a major port with big shipbuilding companies and the nation's largest steel mill. Its heavy industries have attracted the kind of ethnic migration common to the big cities of the East Coast, as well as a large black migration from the South, although Baltimore today is in better economic shape than the cities to the northeast. Washington, whose economy is of course based on government, has been something of a boom town in the 1960s and 1970s. As civil service salaries have risen, the Washington suburbs in Montgomery County have come to have the highest median incomes in the country; as government has grown bigger, Washington has developed a vigorous private economy of lawyers, lobbyists, consultants, trade associations, government contractors, all paying high professional salaries. Much of the growth of Washington has taken place in the Maryland suburbs, where high-rise office building and apartment complexes stand in what was pasture land a few years ago.

Maryland's diversity made the state a pretty good indicator of national trends in presidential elections from 1960 to 1976, coming as close as any state to duplicating the national results. Yet in 1980 Maryland was one of the six states that backed Jimmy Carter. One reason was the southern white vote, not only on the Eastern Shore but in many suburban areas as well; while Carter did not get enough of them to carry more than one rural county, he did do better here than anywhere else in the nation. In the eastern part of the state, the other East Coast states, a

black. This is one state where the black percentage has been increasing (it is now 23%), largely because many Washington area blacks have been moving out from the District of Columbia to Prince Georges County and, although much less often, to Montgomery County as well. As a result, Carter got an absolute majority of the votes in Prince Georges in 1980 — one of the few suburban counties in the nation where he was able to do so. And in Baltimore's black-majority 7th congressional district, Carter had nearly a 100,000-vote plurality over Reagan — far exceeding his statewide plurality. Finally, there is a white working-class vote in Baltimore and its suburbs that went to Carter in 1976 and again in 1980. It is worth noting, finally, one factor that apparently was not of great help to Carter: Maryland's large number of federal employees. There is little evidence in the election returns that the prospect of Reagan's cutting government spending led bureaucrats to vote Democratic. Carter failed to carry Montgomery County and probably lost the white vote in Prince Georges to Reagan as well. Moreover, in the presidential primary voters in the Washington suburbs (like those in the District itself) rejected Carter in favor of Edward Kennedy.

Maryland's growth and the lack of roots here for so many of its suburban citizens have contributed to an unfortunate aspect of the state's public life: its sometimes widespread corruption. Two of its recent governors have been disgraced: Spiro Agnew, who, it turns out, was pocketing payoffs in the vice president's office even as he was excoriating adversaries for immoral behavior; and Marvin Mandel, his canny successor, who was convicted on federal charges of fraud for receiving favors from a few well-placed cronies and doing favors for them in return. Mandel would like to be remembered as a competent manager and a sometimes gifted conductor of the legislature; and it must be said that he was convicted on some novel theories of law and after undergoing scrutiny that many current officials in many states could not withstand.

Nevertheless, the legacy of Mandel and Agnew — and the feelings aroused by the convictions of many local officials — left Maryland voters with a taste for something new in the 1978 gubernatorial election. The acting governor, on Mandel's conviction, was Blair Lee III, bearer of a proud family name — he is related to the Lees of Virginia and the Blairs of Blair House, and his family owned most of what is now downtown Silver Spring — and a man with a candid, crusty personality and an unsmirched reputation for honesty. He was the initial favorite in the Democratic primary, but voters were looking for something new. They found it in a candidate who began almost unknown to the voters, Harry Hughes. He had a competent record in state government, first in the legislature and then as head of Mandel's transportation department — a position he resigned in protest because, he said, of tampering with the process for selecting state contractors. Hughes was from the conservative Eastern Shore but had put together Maryland's one major tax reform and had supported civil rights measures in the 1960s. But all these credentials helped him little until he received the endorsement of the *Baltimore Sun*. In our times newspaper endorsements are seldom influential, but this was different; voters went for Hughes not because they looked to the *Sun* for political advice, but because the *Sun's* editorial was evidence that Hughes was the kind of man they were looking for.

Hughes won the primary solidly and had little trouble in the general election. Republicans have often won the governorship in Maryland but usually only when the Democratic candidate has had some special problem, and Hughes had none. In office Hughes has generated

quiet his lieutenant governor, an obscure Prince Georges County council member who was recruited for the ticket when Hughes seemed to have no chance; this man is painfully inarticulate and at the same time fervently opposed to abortion, and it is certain that Hughes will drop him in 1982. Otherwise, it is possible that Hughes will win reelection without strenuous competition.

The money in Maryland politics is in state and local office. There have been no allegations of corruption or even patronage-oriented politics about the members of the state's congressional delegation. Its senior member, Senator Charles Mathias, is a model of probity and integrity. From an old family in Frederick County, in the hills west of Washington and Baltimore, he served as a liberal Republican congressman from a district including Montgomery County in the 1960s and was elected to the Senate in 1968. Mathias is the old-fashioned kind of Republican for whom one of the party's main attractions is its historic record on civil rights and he was not pleased to see his party dominated by civil rights legislation foes such as Barry Goldwater. Mathias is the second-ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee, which handles civil rights; in 1979, when Republicans were still far from a Senate majority, Strom Thurmond made a point of exercising his seniority and taking the ranking chair on Judiciary rather than on Armed Services, as he could have, precisely to prevent Mathias from getting it. As a result, Thurmond is now chairman of the Judiciary Committee and was able to abolish the Antitrust Subcommittee Mathias would have headed; Mathias has no power to hire staff and may end up as part of the committee's minority on many votes.

Mathias was not part of the Republican unity so apparent in 1980. He endorsed Ronald Reagan only perfunctorily and made it clear that he viewed the prospect of a Reagan presidency with some distaste. As a result, he is not a particular favorite among many Senate Republicans. Not only is he not chairman of Judiciary (although he does chair the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice) but he was persuaded to give up a high-ranking seat on the Appropriations Committee (behind Chairman Mark Hatfield and Republican Whip Ted Stevens) and to take a middle-ranking position on Foreign Relations in return. He also got to chair the Rules and Administration Committee, a body that is not especially important unless something unusual comes along (such as the nomination of a new vice president). That post was open because all of its Republican members in the previous Congress had better chairmanships or in one case a Cabinet position; even the most conservative members could hardly deny it to Mathias, who after all is tied for eighth in seniority among Senate Republicans. He chairs the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the District of Columbia — still an important post for a Maryland senator.

As a member of the minority party during the partisan struggles of the Nixon Administration, Mathias was often in a key position, sometimes going along with Democrats, sometimes sticking with Republicans. He is one of those senators whose views are considered sound and whose judgment on difficult issues is respected and sought. How he will fare as one of the few members of an otherwise cohesive majority inclined to dissent from his party's orthodoxy is less clear. Mathias has high ratings from liberal and labor organizations, and conservative groups definitely feel he is not one of their own. Yet he does have a greater respect for the free-market system than do most Democrats. In all, he seems a man more temperamentally suited to careful, judicious opposition than to strong advocacy of any establishment's program.

Mathias seemed threatened for a while with opposition in the Republican primary in 1980, and a few years earlier even toyed with the idea of running as an independent. Primary opposition from someone like Robert Bauman — the congressman who later got in trouble for personal reasons — could have hurt or even defeated Mathias in a primary limited to a relatively small number of registered Republicans. As it was, against five little-known opponents, the senator won with just 55% of the vote. In the general election, against a Prince Georges County legislator who campaigned most heatedly on the abortion issue, Mathias carried Baltimore city and every county and won 66% of the vote.

The state's other senator, Paul Sarbanes, is a Democrat from Baltimore in his first term. He won his seat in 1976 rather easily, despite prominent opposition, beating former Senator Joseph Tydings in the Democratic primary and incumbent Senator Glenn Beall in the general election. Sarbanes's voting record is generally considered liberal, but temperamentally he is even more cautious than Mathias and seldom lets others know what he is thinking until he has made up his mind. In a state where Democratic politicians usually get ahead in a gregarious, back-slapping environment, Sarbanes has always been something of a loner: a rebel against Marvin Mandel in the state Assembly, an insurgent who took on an incumbent U.S. congressman and committee chairman in the 1970 primary, a House Judiciary Committee member who was expected all along to support Nixon's impeachment but who did not commit himself until he had digested all the evidence. Sarbanes has come out a winner from all these situations not because he has made friends but because he works hard and knows his stuff.

Now Sarbanes is part of the minority. He has a seat on the Banking Committee but gets most notice on Foreign Relations, where he is an intellectual leader of the now heavily outnumbered liberals wary of arms spending and of situations that could prove to be more Vietnams. He is of Greek descent, and he spent much time and effort maintaining for some years the embargo on arms sales to Turkey in retaliation for Turkey's invasion of Cyprus.

Sarbanes's seat is up in 1982, and he has been named to some right-wing hit lists. By the kind of conventional analysis that made sense until the Democrats lost the Senate, he should not be in any kind of trouble; he has not offended any significant segment of voters, his Democratic label is still an asset here rather than a liability as Jimmy Carter has proved, and there are no obvious prominent Republican candidates. But in early 1981 the New Right group, NCPAC, ran a series of TV ads against Sarbanes, and suddenly everyone began expecting a seriously contested race. One possible opponent is Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Holt.

Maryland has a rather odd history of Democratic presidential primaries. George Wallace nearly won in 1964, at which point the legislature abolished the primary; it was revived for 1972, when Wallace did win, the day after he was shot in a Prince Georges County shopping center. In 1976 this was the first primary Jerry Brown contested and, in alliance with such distinctly non-New Politics leaders as Marvin Mandel, he managed to beat Jimmy Carter here. Brown took that to mean that his philosophy could attract many votes; more likely it meant that voters, in the knowledge that Jimmy Carter would be nominated anyway, were willing to give some encouragement to a more interesting and entertaining candidate. In the 1980 Maryland primary, held after Brown had withdrawn his candidacy, he got only 3% of the vote, while Carter was beating Kennedy by 47%-38%.

The continuing shift of population to the suburbs — or at least some of the suburbs — has required considerable redistricting, but it is possible to adjust the lines with minimal damage to any of the state's incumbent House members. Possibly the Democratic legislature and governor would like to cause some damage to Marjorie Holt, the one Republican in the delegation, but, given the demographics and her strong base in Anne Arundel County, it will be difficult to do so.

Census Data Pop. (1980 final) 4,216,446, up 7% in 1970s: 1.86% of U.S. total, 18th largest. Central city, 19%; suburban, 65%. Median 4-person family income, 1978, \$23,461, 115% of U.S., 2d highest.

1979 Share of Federal Tax Burden \$9,602,000,000; 2.13% of U.S. total, 13th largest.

1979 Share of Federal Outlays \$11,649,092,000; 2.51% of U.S. total, 14th largest.

DOD	\$3,375,777,000	10th (3.18%)	HEW	\$3,802,481,000	15th (2.13%)
DOE	\$494,918,000	8th (4.21%)	ERDA	\$24,989,000	19th (0.92%)
HUD	\$121,130,000	17th (1.84%)	NASA	\$394,648,000	4th (8.44%)
VA	\$305,646,000	27th (1.47%)	DOT	\$399,389,000	14th (2.42%)
EPA	\$124,507,000	15th (2.34%)	DOC	\$465,311,000	1st (14.69%)
DOI	\$48,561,000,000	27th (0.87%)	USDA	\$307,445,000	34th (1.28%)

Economic Base Finance, insurance, and real estate; primary metal industries, especially blast furnaces and steel mills; food and kindred products; agriculture, notably dairy products, broilers, cattle, and corn; electrical equipment and supplies, especially communication equipment; transportation equipment, especially motor vehicles and equipment and ship building and repairing; apparel and other textile products.

Political Lineup Governor, Harry R. Hughes (D). Senators, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R) and Paul S. Sarbanes (D). Representatives, 8 (7 D and 1 R); 8 in 1982. State Senate, 47 (40 D and 7 R); State House of Delegates, 141 (125 D and 16 R).

The Voters

Registration 2,064,883 Total. 1,431,339 D (69%); 482,955 R (23%); 160,582 other (8%).
Employment profile 1970 White collar, 41%. Blue collar, 44%. Service, 12%. Farm, 3%.
Ethnic groups Black 1980, 23%. Hispanic 1980, 2%. Asian 1980, 2%. Total foreign stock 1970, 12%. Germany, 2%; Italy, USSR, UK, Poland, 1% each.

Presidential Vote

1980	Reagan (R)	680,606	(44%)
	Carter (D)	726,161	(47%)
	Anderson (I)	119,537	(8%)
1976	Ford (R)	672,661	(47%)
	Carter (D)	759,612	(53%)

1980 Democratic Presidential Primary

Carter	226,528	(47%)
Kennedy	181,091	(38%)
Three others	23,592	(5%)
Uncommitted	45,879	(10%)

1980 Republican Presidential Primary

Reagan	80,557	(48%)
Bush	68,389	(41%)
Anderson	16,244	(10%)
One other	2,113	(1%)

SENATORS

Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R) Elected 1968, seat up 1986; b. July 24, 1922, Frederick; home, Frederick; Haverford Col., B.A. 1944, U. of Md., LL.B. 1949.



Career Navy, WWII; Asst. Atty. Gen. of Md., 1953-54; Frederick City Atty., 1954-59; Md. House of Delegates, 1959-60; U.S. House of Reps., 1961-69.

Offices 358 RSOB, 202-224-4654. Also 1616 Fed. Ofc. Bldg., 31 Hopkins Plaza, Baltimore 21201, 301-962-4850.

Committees Foreign Relations (6th). Subcommittees: International Economic Policy (Chairman); African Affairs; European Affairs.

Governmental Affairs (4th). Subcommittees: Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations; Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia (Chairman); Civil Service, Post Office, and General Services.

Judiciary (2d). Subcommittees: Criminal Law (Chairman); Juvenile Justice; Regulatory Reform.

Rules and Administration (Chairman).

Joint Committee on the Library (Vice-chairman).

Joint Committee on Printing (Chairman).

Group Ratings

	ADA	COPE	PC	LCV	CFA	RPN	NAB	NSI	NTU	ACA	ACU
1980	72	100	53	62	60	—	0	33	18	8	7
1979	63	79	52	—	62	—	—	—	18	15	0
1978	50	76	53	68	30	100	18	13	9	22	5

Key Votes

1) Draft Registn \$	AGN	6) Fair Housng Cloture	FOR	11) Cut Socl Incr Defns	—
2) Ban \$ to Nicaragua	FOR	7) Ban \$ Rape Abortns	AGN	12) Income Tax Indexing	AGN
3) Delay MX Missile	—	8) Cap on Food Stmp \$	AGN	13) Lim Spdng 21% GNP	FOR
4) Nuclr Mortorium	AGN	9) New US Dep Edcatn	FOR	14) Incr Wndfl Prof Tax	FOR
5) Alaska Lands Bill	FOR	10) Cut OSHA Insptcns	AGN	15) Chryslr Loan Grntee	FOR

Election Results

1980 general	Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R)	850,970	(66%)	(\$848,456)
	Edward T. Conroy (D)	435,118	(34%)	(\$162,966)
1980 primary	Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R)	82,430	(55%)	
	John M. Brennan (R)	24,848	(17%)	(\$73,338)
	V. Dallas Merrell (R)	23,073	(13%)	(\$71,448)
	Three others (R)	19,622	(13%)	
1974 general	Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R)	503,223	(57%)	(\$329,845)
	Barbara A. Mikulski (D)	374,563	(43%)	(\$74,311)

Election Results

1980 general	Michael D. Barnes (D)	148,301	(59%)	(\$349,924)
	Newton I. Steers, Jr. (R)	101,659	(41%)	(\$565,952)
1980 primary	Michael D. Barnes (D), unopposed			
1978 general	Michael D. Barnes (D)	81,851	(51%)	(\$134,588)
	Newton I. Steers, Jr. (R)	77,807	(49%)	(\$162,980)

MASSACHUSETTS

Massachusetts politics is full of seeming paradoxes. This is the state that gives us Edward Kennedy, the leading spokesman for what is known as liberalism today, but in 1980 it went for Ronald Reagan and in 1978 elected as its governor a man whose campaign manager said he won the primary by putting all the hate groups in a cauldron and letting them boil. It is the only state that went for dovish George McGovern in 1972, but it is also the only state besides New York to go for hawkish Henry Jackson in the 1976 presidential primary. Such paradoxes cannot be explained on the basis of the recent results alone. To resolve them it is necessary to go back into history, to see how Massachusetts politics developed.

The crucial event that structured electoral politics here was not, as it was in so many states, the Civil War—it was instead the Irish potato famine of the 1840s. That blight forced hundreds of thousands of Irish to immigrate to the United States, to the point where there are far more people of Irish descent here than in Ireland today. Nowhere did these new Americans make a greater impact than in Boston and Massachusetts. They found a thriving Yankee economic and political culture whose hostility was symbolized by “No Irish need apply” signs. And ever since, much of politics in Massachusetts has been a struggle between Yankee and Irish for domination.

That ethnic conflict was very much reflected in party politics. The Yankees of the 1840s, not long removed from Federalism, were solid Whigs, who would later become one of the bulwarks of the Republican Party when it was formed a decade later. The Whigs and Republicans had policies that appealed to the Yankees: promotion of public works to help business (the Yankees were busy building roads and textile mills), protective tariffs, sympathy for suitably distant oppressed people such as the blacks of the South and for such uplifting social movements as temperance. The Irish knew from the beginning that they were not going to get very far in the party of the Yankees, and they found the Democrats of the 19th century more congenial. We now think of the Democrats as a party promoting government action, but in those days the Democracy represented laissez-faire—which was fine with the Irish. They came from a place where the government was the enemy; they didn't want the government spending money to help the rich, they didn't want it to regulate immigration, they didn't want it to promote the cause of blacks who might compete with them in the labor market, and they didn't want it to prohibit liquor. They were people familiar with competing hierarchies—the hierarchy of the hated English lords and the hierarchy of their own, often suppressed, Roman Catholic Church. The Democratic Party, with its ward organizations and rituals, seemed like a sympathetic hierarchy. So the Irish went into politics, determined to beat the Protestants.

And that is pretty much the story of a century of Massachusetts politics. Throughout, the Irish share of the population continually rose—and there were other immigrants, who usually became Democrats, too—while the Yankee share of the population declined. Yankees had smaller families, they moved out west; the Irish stayed put and eventually ruled as Massachusetts very slowly moved from being one of our most Republican states to becoming one of our most Democratic. The state gave Republicans majorities in every presidential election from the Civil War to 1924; in 1928, when the Democrats nominated an Irish Catholic, Al Smith, Massachusetts went Democratic. In 1918 the state had elected a Democratic senator, but Republicans won as many congressional seats as Democrats in the years to come. In the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, a pretty close balance existed between Yankee Republicans and Irish Democrats; the Democrats were making headway, but the Republicans fielded candidates who were smarter or more honest. The state's preference in presidential elections shifted very little in this period. While the nation oscillated between Roosevelt and Eisenhower, in Massachusetts it was the balance between Yankee and Irish, not the programs of the New Deal or the popularity of individual candidates that usually made the difference.

Thus political conflict in Massachusetts never really fell into the liberal vs. conservative lines of the New Deal. The Republicans here retained a kind of Yankee interventionism, strongly favoring civil rights, pushing an anti-isolationist foreign policy, opposing the excesses of Joe McCarthy. Massachusetts Democrats, on the other hand, like the Republic of Ireland, were hostile to the British and cheered Joe McCarthy after World War II as one of their own. (Joseph Kennedy used to invite him to Hyannisport.) The Republicans promised to root out corruption. The Democrats had the more complacent attitude typical of an ethnic group only recently able to aspire to public office.

In the 1960s and 1970s, for the first time in Massachusetts history, the Irish Democrats and the Yankee Republicans began moving in the same direction. The key figure is Senator Edward Kennedy. More even than his brother the president, he has by personal example helped to shape attitudes in the state; after all, he has been the leading public figure here for nearly 20 years. On a whole series of issues, Kennedy as well as the national Democratic Party took positions that in Massachusetts had been more typical of interventionist Yankees than laissez-faire Irish. Kennedy strongly supported civil rights, he favored helping people who were impoverished or starving, he opposed the war in Vietnam, he stood against the excesses of Watergate. He was also indubitably against corruption. Kennedy's stands made such positions respectable, even mandatory, among Democratic politicians and among the Catholic majority of voters in Massachusetts. And his stands led the Yankee minority to vote more and more often for the Democratic Party. It was no accident then, and not simply the result of local recession, that Massachusetts voted for McGovern in 1972. It represented a kind of reconciliation here, which saw the upper-crust Yankee suburb of Lincoln and the lower-income Irish city of Somerville going for the same candidate.

But that does not mean that Yankee and Irish conflicts have ended. On the contrary, they emerged in classic form in the 1978 gubernatorial election. The incumbent governor, Michael Dukakis, had been elected in 1974 as a kind of cerebral liberal. He had attracted attention early by his personal austerity (riding to work on the subway) and by cutting the state budget drastically. His actions probably had majority support, but nobody really felt he was their man. The liberals felt betrayed by the budget cuts, while Irish and other ethnics found him cold and unwilling to wheel and deal politically. Almost everyone was unhappy when he

raised taxes after promising not to do so. As a result, Dukakis was more vulnerable in the Democratic primary than he supposed, and he was beaten by one Edward King.

If Ted Kennedy represents the liberal and humanitarian side of Massachusetts Irish politics, King represents the conservative and resentful side. Kennedy the millionaire makes a point of flying tourist on scheduled airlines; King, the self-made man, loves expense account living. In his primary campaign King emphasized his support of capital punishment, mandatory prison sentences for drug dealers, raising the drinking age to 21, building nuclear power plants, downplaying environmental concerns, and spurring economic growth. King was opposed by a Republican who was a quintessential Yankee: Francis Hatch, a rich North Shore state legislator, who inherited liberal support when Dukakis lost the primary. House Speaker Tip O'Neill tried to persuade King to downplay his cultural issues and to emphasize that he stood in the Democratic economic tradition of helping the little guy. O'Neill had a special interest in the election: his son, Thomas O'Neill III, was the incumbent lieutenant governor, who was tied to King's ticket and would lose if King did. King ended up prevailing by a small margin. Examination of the election returns shows that the outcome was nothing other than the standard triumph of Irish over Yankee. Hatch made big gains in university towns and well-to-do areas where McGovern had done well, but he could not crack the solidly Catholic middle-class suburbs of Boston. The result was not so much a repudiation of liberalism in Massachusetts as it was an assertion of the commonwealth's traditional ethnic politics.

Nevertheless, King's administration has made a difference in the way this state is governed. In the early 1970s, under liberal Republican Governor Francis Sargent, government had grown like wildfire in Massachusetts, and its taxes became the highest in the nation. King vowed to change that. He acted clumsily, made enemies, made bad appointments, on occasion looked foolish—but to some extent he succeeded in what he set out to do. State taxes were lowered, and in a referendum called Proposition 2½ voters put a cap on local property taxes. King's policies seemed to bear fruit. In 1980 and in early 1981 Massachusetts had a much lower rate of unemployment and a much more buoyant economy than other northeastern states, while in the middle 1970s it had lagged behind. Supply-side economists claimed that lower taxes had stimulated entrepreneurial energy and economic growth. Others said that Massachusetts economy had finally shed its heritage of low-wage jobs to be one based on high wages and high technology growth—a development having nothing to do with King.

King is sure to have plenty of opposition in 1982. Most politically active Democrats consider him anathema. Tom O'Neill is likely to be a candidate, and Michael Dukakis might run again. The Republicans will probably also try to field a significant candidate. The economic condition of the state, and the condition of its less fortunate citizens in the Reagan years, are sure to be central subjects in the campaign. But the chances are that it will come down, in the end, to something like the old battle of Yankee versus Irish.

That is the prospect as well for the 1982 Senate race, in which Edward Kennedy will run for his seat again. Some speculate that Kennedy may be vulnerable, and he has been targeted by New Right groups. But there is no reason to believe that he can be beaten in Massachusetts. He won the 1980 presidential primary here by an impressive margin, even when he was losing in most other states. President Carter's weak Massachusetts showing—his 42% was 12% below George McGovern's percentage—does not tell us much about Kennedy's ap-

Kennedy is still regarded by most Massachusetts voters as a member of a kind of royal family. He was elected originally at age 30, when he had no substantial credentials of his own. He was reelected by a substantial majority here one year after the Chappaquiddick accident. Even today pictures of his brother still hang on walls in living rooms and bars all over Massachusetts. Kennedy also has substantial accomplishments in the Senate, from the work he did in leading revision of the immigration bills in 1965 to his work, unlikely to meet success soon, seeking a national health care program.

Kennedy's record, indeed, would be a formidable asset to any senator. Considered by many a doctrinaire liberal, he was nonetheless the first politician seriously to press for airline deregulation, and despite the opposition of most of the airlines and such well-positioned committee chairmen as Howard Cannon of Nevada, Kennedy (allied on the issue with the Carter Administration) was successful. He also obtained some measure of success deregulating the trucking industry. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1979 and 1980, he worked with his Republican counterpart (and, although no one knew it at the time, successor) Strom Thurmond to reform the federal criminal code. This is all highly technical business and Edward Kennedy, who has the reputation in some quarters as a playboy, is in fact a very hard worker who masters details and outargues the opposition. He could not in any other way have achieved the legislative successes he has.

In 1981, with the Democrats in the minority, Kennedy abandoned his top position on Judiciary to become ranking minority member of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee. He evidently felt that Labor is where many of the important fights of the next two years were to be fought. Labor has jurisdiction over many of the social programs Kennedy wants to keep and Reagan wants to kill; over some difficult cultural issues; and over the labor laws, about which organized labor is very worried indeed. Kennedy, who spent much of his earlier Senate career in careful deference to his elders, now finds that after 18 years he is the ranking minority member on a committee chaired by Orrin Hatch of Utah, who was first elected to the Senate in 1976. Kennedy's switch from concentrating on Judiciary to concentrating on Labor relieves him from a position where his stands on controversial issues—constitutional amendments on abortion and balancing the budget, busing, capital punishment—were either unpopular or politically dangerous. But it also suggests that he is gambling that the positions he took on economic issues that proved to be so unhelpful in his 1980 presidential campaign will be more popular in the future.

The 1980 campaign must have been a profoundly unnerving experience for Kennedy, a man who many have assumed will just naturally be president. He turned down nominations he probably could have had in 1968 and 1972; he refused to run, and made that refusal stick, in 1976. For a while, even while the polls showed him way ahead of President Carter and the Republicans, it looked as if he would not run in 1980. Then, during the summer of 1979, he evidently changed his mind. Carter's much publicized Camp David domestic energy summit and his malaise speech both fell flat. The president himself had adopted a truculent attitude; if Kennedy runs, he made sure reporters heard, "I'll whip his ass," even though Kennedy, one of the best-known figures in American politics, was way ahead in the polls at the time.

Why did Kennedy's standing decline so suddenly and disastrously in the fall of 1979? First of all, there was what some called the character factor and others called Chappaquiddick. Although the incident was known to everyone for ten years before Kennedy ran, the impact undoubtedly increased when he entered the race. Stories were circulating depicting Kennedy

Kennedy probably spends more time with his own. A second factor was his halting performance in the Roger Mudd interview, where he seemed unable to articulate any rationale for running. Third, there was the Iran crisis. Kennedy had the misfortune to announce his candidacy (as did Jerry Brown) the week the hostages were seized in Tehran. In early December he made statements criticizing the Shah for "running one of the most violent regimes in the history of mankind" and the administration for letting the Shah into the United States. Although many voters agreed with his assessments, even more felt that this was not an appropriate time to say things that might suggest that the Iranian terrorists had a legitimate reason for their acts. Kennedy was undoubtedly hurt by the tendency of voters to rally around the president in a time of crisis. But his own actions and comments accelerated his drop in the polls.

So by the beginning of 1980 Kennedy was far behind Carter among Democratic primary voters, and he never really recovered. In January he lost by more than 2-1 in the Iowa caucuses, where there was a record turnout. In February he lost in the New Hampshire primary, right next door to Massachusetts, a contest in which a large majority of the voters are Catholic. He won impressively in Massachusetts. And, just as his campaign seemed about to collapse, he won in New York, where he was helped by the Carter Administration's vote against Israel the week before in the United Nations. Kennedy won other primaries, mostly in eastern states, but a few elsewhere: Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, South Dakota, New Mexico, and California. He won the Arizona caucuses. But most of these victories were achieved only after it was evident that he could not win the nomination. Kennedy stayed in the race after the primaries because, he said, the president refused to debate him; and Carter in fact made no overtures to his beaten opponent. The result was that the August convention in New York nominated Carter but was controlled by Kennedy. Conventions have become a form of television advertisement for the majority candidate but a minority candidate with a cohesive following greater than one-third of the delegates can, by use of the rules and delaying tactics, keep the majority candidate off prime time. Kennedy had 40% of the votes, and as his price for maintaining the schedule Carter wanted, he extracted platform planks and the right to make a speech Tuesday night. When Kennedy began to speak, it became evident why he had remained in the race (although he had formally withdrawn by that time). This is his metier: a rousing inspirational speech to a huge, enthusiastic audience, the words beautifully crafted, the lines stirringly delivered: "For all those whose cares have been our concern, the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives, and the dream shall never die." Nothing Carter did could come close to matching this performance.

Many Kennedy supporters assume it is just a matter of time before he is the Democratic nominee in 1984 and then president. But 1980 suggests some reasons for caution. The character factors that hurt him will still be around. His issue stands — his support of more government protection for the poor and the middle class — were a liability in 1980 and, unless opinion changes, will be a liability in 1984. Kennedy believes strongly in an expansion of the government's role, in national health insurance, in a bigger government jobs program; he seems to see a nation where millions are economically deprived and desperately in need of help. The problem is that most American voters today don't believe that Kennedy's picture is accurate any longer. Since 1964 they have not given a majority of their votes to a candidate

could shift into a depression, many more poor and deprived people could suddenly start voting, and Kennedy's ideas could become much more popular. But the fact is that those who back those ideas had hoped to get into the White House in 1980 more from Kennedy's personal popularity than from the popularity of those ideas. Now they must do the hard slogging work of persuading people that their vision is accurate and their programs desirable.

If Kennedy should show any weakness in Massachusetts in 1982, it will be because of his stands on issues. This is perhaps the last state that would abandon the idea of a large, compassionate government. But the current of ideas, even in Massachusetts, seems to be moving in the other direction. Do all the Anderson voters share Kennedy's economic views? Do people in this increasingly high-wage state see themselves as part of a society where millions remain poor and helpless? Kennedy will almost surely avoid really serious opposition and should win by a big margin. But the Massachusetts Senate race will be worth watching for what it tells us about the strength of his ideas and of his likely presidential candidacy in 1984.

Kennedy must have supposed that when young Democratic Congressman Paul Tsongas beat Republican Edward Brooke for the state's other Senate seat that he finally had a colleague who would tend industriously to Massachusetts matters and leave him freer to concentrate on broad national issues. Tsongas, after all, had been a congressman from Lowell for two terms and had spent much effort on the renewal program in that old, but now once again prosperous, industrial city. Tsongas's campaign in the crowded Democratic primary had emphasized his difficult-to-pronounce name. In the general election the dominant figure was that of Brooke: a talented and articulate man in terrible trouble because of a bitter divorce and a disputed property settlement. Tsongas tastefully avoided that whole matter and emphasized that he was closer to Edward Kennedy's views on economic issues than Brooke was. The result was that Brooke was narrowly defeated. He was the first (and so far only) black elected to the Senate by popular vote; he was a leader on a variety of legislative issues including abortion, on which he courageously led the opposition to cutting off government funding for abortion.

Tsongas has proved also to be a senator more interested in national than local issues. In his first year he tried to get on the Foreign Relations Committee; but that would have put two Greek-Americans on that body just as the Carter Administration was trying to resume military aid to Turkey. He served instead on Energy, where as a northeasterner he tended to oppose all attempts to end energy price controls, and on Banking. In 1980 he succeeded in moving from Banking to Foreign Relations. Tsongas attracted the most attention when, at the 1980 ADA convention, he made a speech saying that Democrats were going to have to rethink their programs and come up with new ideas. The reception, even from ADAers and even before the November 1980 election, was favorable. Tsongas had articulated the sense that many Democrats had that their programs had become disconnected from reality and that their list of goals had become more a theological litany than a program for action. On specifics, Tsongas seems not quite so ready to depart from the standard Democratic agenda. But he has succeeded in establishing himself as a thoughtful national figure and as advancing the public discussion in a direction that seems inevitable now but was not where it was going before.

Massachusetts loses one of its 12 congressional seats for 1982. In this heavily Democratic state the likely victim of the redistricting process is one of the state's two Republican members of Congress, Margaret Heckler. Her long, thin, attenuated 10th district seems likely to

voters didn't want it anyway, was Washington experience. It turned out that he had never been in Washington at all; reporters took to writing "Mr. Smith goes to Washington" stories about him as soon as he came to serve out the rest of Macdonald's term.

Markey has not behaved like a neophyte politically. He won seats on the Commerce and Interior Committees and in 1981 won the chair of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of Interior. Markey hoped to use this to spotlight misdeeds of the oil companies and to demonstrate the dangers and impracticalities of nuclear power. He must proceed with some caution, however, since at least one of the Democrats on the subcommittee, Beverly Byron, often votes with Republicans.

Markey has been reelected either by a spectacular margin or has been unopposed. His one serious problem could be redistricting. His district is one that, by virtue of its geographic position and population, could easily be eliminated, and reportedly he does not have many powerful friends in the Massachusetts State House. His best hopes are that the legislators will be persuaded to target Republican Margaret Heckler instead, and this seems more likely; even so, Markey will at the least gain new territory that may contain ambitious young Democratic politicians, or perhaps even a Republican.

Census Data Pop. (1980 final) 451,683, down 5% in 1970s. Median family income, 1970, \$11,406, 119% of U.S.


The Voters

Employment profile 1970 White collar, 57%. Blue collar, 32%. Service, 11%. Farm, -%.
Ethnic groups Black 1980, 1%. Hispanic 1980, 2%. Asian 1980, 1%. Total foreign stock 1970, 37%. Italy, 12%; Canada, 9%; Ireland, 4%; USSR, UK, 3% each; Poland, 1%.

Presidential Vote

1980	Reagan (R)	90,726	(42%)
	Carter (D)	91,189	(42%)
	Anderson (I)	30,656	(14%)
1976	Ford (R)	86,572	(39%)
	Carter (D)	126,935	(57%)

Rep. Edward J. Markey (D) Elected 1976; b. July 11, 1946, Malden; home, Malden; Boston Col., B.A. 1968, J.D. 1972.



Career Mass House of Reps., 1973-76.
Offices 403 CHOB, 202-225-2836. Also 2100A JFK Fed. Bldg., Boston 02203, 617-223-2781.
Committees *Energy and Commerce* (10th). Subcommittees: Energy Conservation and Power; Fossil and Synthetic Fuels; Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance.
Interior and Insular Affairs (13th). Subcommittees: Energy and the Environment; Oversight and Investigations (Chairman).

Group Ratings

1980	ADA	COPE	PC	LCV	CFA	RPN	NAB	NSI	NTU	ACA	ACU
	83	84	83	100	82						

Key Votes

1) Draft Registr \$	AGN	6) Fair Hsg DOJ Enfr	FOR	11) Cut Socl Incr Dfns \$	AGN
2) Ban \$ to Nicrgua	AGN	7) Lim PAC Contrbtns	FOR	12) Hosptl Cost Controls	FOR
3) Dlay MX Missile	FOR	8) Cap on Food Stmp \$	AGN	13) Gasln Ctrls & Allctns	FOR
4) Nuclr Mortorium	FOR	9) New US Dep Edcatn	FOR	14) Lim Wndfll Prof Tax	AGN
5) Alaska Lands Bill	FOR	10) Cut OSHA \$	AGN	15) Chryslr Loan Grntee	FOR

Election Results

1980 general	Edward J. Markey (D)	155,759	(100%)	(\$67,173)
1980 primary	Edward J. Markey (D)	29,190	(85%)	
	James J. Murphy (D)	5,247	(15%)	(\$0)
1978 general	Edward J. Markey (D)	145,615	(85%)	(\$60,542)
	James J. Murphy (I)	26,017	(15%)	

EIGHTH DISTRICT

The 8th of Massachusetts is a congressional district with a number of distinctive features. It is the home of no less than three major universities—Harvard, MIT, and Boston University—and of dozens of small colleges; in all, the 8th has the second highest proportion of college students (15% of the potential electorate in 1970) in the nation. The 8th is distinctive physically: it includes most of Boston's downtown, with its 1920s buildings alternating with modern architecture and Faneuil Hall and the restored 1820s Quincy Market. It has literally dozens of distinctive neighborhoods, from the Italian quarter in Boston's North End to the insular Irish community of Charlestown, the newer Portuguese community in Cambridge, the Armenians in Watertown, the elderly Jews of Brighton, and the upper-income Yankees and professors of Belmont. And it is distinctive in its congressional representation. This heavily Democratic part of heavily Democratic Massachusetts has been represented successively by a president of the United States and a speaker of the House of Representatives—the only district in American history with such a record.

The president of course was John Kennedy, who won this seat in 1946 as a rich young veteran and held it for six years while waiting to run for the Senate; and the speaker is Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, elected here in 1952 after serving as the first Democratic speaker of the Massachusetts house, and speaker of the House in Washington since the beginning of 1977.

O'Neill is a man of town, not gown, politics, and he still feels most comfortable in the company of experienced Irish pols. In his first years in the House, he was a man who got along by going along—and got a seat on the Rules Committee out of it. In 1967, however, he took the step—rare at the time—of coming out publicly against Lyndon Johnson's policy in Vietnam. This was long before the university vote was important in the district; O'Neill had been persuaded by his children that the war was wrong. As an Irish big city pol who supported the antiwar position, he was a natural bridge between different segments of the Democratic Caucus in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

He also knew how to count. In 1971 he supported Hale Boggs's candidacy for majority leader and brought a number of eastern votes along with him. Boggs won, and O'Neill was appointed whip. When Boggs was lost in a plane crash in 1972, O'Neill succeeded to the majority leadership essentially without opposition. The succession to the speakership, after

decessors and indeed was seldom true of the fabled Sam Rayburn in his later years. Part of the reason for O'Neill's effectiveness is lack of competing power centers. The Rules Committee, no longer chaired by southern conservatives, is responsive to the speaker's wishes. Such committee chairmen as Wilbur Mills of Ways and Means and Wayne Hays of House Administration are gone. Phillip Burton, defeated in 1976 for majority leader by one vote, is not a close O'Neill friend; Jim Wright, the man who did win, does not have as much of a personal power base. If power in the House today is diffused among dozens of subcommittee chairmen and activist members of both parties, it is also concentrated to a greater extent than it used to be at the top, in the hands of the speaker. Some of those who complain that there are no strong leaders in the House anymore are columnists who used to have good sources on the Hill but who now do not get the inside story and scoop from O'Neill. Instead, the speaker is candid about his plans and strategies in open press conference.

O'Neill is a highly partisan man, and unlike some of his predecessors, he has no great affection for his Republican counterparts. Republicans are the enemy, and the speaker sees his job as getting legislation through with Democratic votes. His task will be more difficult now that there are only 242 Democratic votes—just 26 more than the majority of 218—than it was when there were 290, as there were just after the 1974 elections. O'Neill's job will be even more difficult since President Reagan, at least at the beginning of his term, seemed to be doing a fine job of defining the issues and controlling the dialogue. O'Neill has shown, however, that he can be a legislative strategist of great talent. The best example is the energy bill in the 95th Congress. When the Carter Administration advanced its proposals, O'Neill's impulse was to help get them through the House. But it would be difficult. Various committees had jurisdiction over different parts of the program, and they had different policy preferences; the House had failed to report out anything at all when President Ford submitted an energy bill. So O'Neill set up an ad hoc committee, including members from all the relevant committees that had to pass on the substantive legislation. He chose as its chairman Thomas Ashley of Ohio, a competent worker with few personal enemies and without the sort of ambition that makes other members nervous or jealous. He got the main problems thrashed out in that committee and then got the legislative committees to report out the bill. Most of the points in the program he put into one major bill, which members had to vote up or down; there would be no piece-by-piece dismemberment of the legislation on the floor. Certain particularly important and controversial provisions—notably the question of de-regulation of natural gas—were to be voted on separately. Then the bill passed the House. It was quite a contrast with the Senate's approach to the same legislation, which featured lengthy and often frivolous filibustering, endless nonbargaining at conference committee. O'Neill framed the issues, got an up-or-down vote, and passed a major bill. There had not been a performance like this in the House for a long, long time.

But this episode also shows what has turned out to be O'Neill's greatest weakness: he does not set goals on major issues himself. When he became speaker, he expected the national administration of his party to establish its priorities on issues and to come up with specific programs; when the Carter Administration did this, as on energy, O'Neill performed ably. But too often the Carter Administration had no priorities or sent up legislation, such as its welfare and tax reforms, about which it soon became clear that the president really cared very little. O'Neill is the old-fashioned kind of Democrat who believes in generous aid to the poor and the helpless. The Carter Administration kept sending him conflicting signals—or

O'Neill is now faced with an entirely different situation, and like many other Democrats he is not sure what course to follow. Priorities were set very clearly at the start of the Reagan Administration, and Democrats could not decide whether to put up a probably futile fight against the Reagan budget cuts or whether to go along and concede the issue to Reagan. O'Neill the partisan Democrat may be torn one way and O'Neill the leader of one branch of government the other. Presumably he will lead a fight on at least some points, but choosing that ground is difficult and there is no national administration and there are no nationally respected leaders to give guidance. O'Neill, after 44 years as a legislator—16 in Massachusetts and 28 in Washington—is now forced to make the kind of decisions on which he and all other legislative leaders have been accustomed to deferring to others. His task is all the more difficult because House Democrats so obviously do not agree among themselves on either strategy or tactics—not to speak of issue positions. O'Neill may have control of procedure in the House; he has a substantial majority on the Rules Committee and a strong ally in Chairman Richard Bolling. But on most issues the traditional Democratic position probably does not command a majority on the House floor. O'Neill can use procedure to help him win a few additional votes here and there, or to prevent Republicans from framing the issue most favorably to their cause. But he is the kind of leader who tends to allow up-or-down votes on major substantive issues, and he seems unlikely to control many outcomes through procedural legerdemain.

O'Neill must in some respects be a frustrated man: he is the best speaker the House has had for some time, and yet his party has steadily lost members since he assumed that post. Those losses result largely from issues beyond his ability to control. But the fact is that he does not present the kind of image that voters seem to want; he is part of an older, backroom tradition of politics, and he does not have the smooth, soft-toned television delivery of a Howard Baker. O'Neill did display a mastery of the proceedings at the 1980 Democratic National Convention, which would have gotten out of control if the Carter forces had been able to do what they wanted unhampered by the calm and independent force of the speaker; but this is a subtle kind of performance that few television viewers were able to appreciate. Their image of O'Neill is probably more like that of the careless white-maned driver of the car that runs out of gas in the very effective Republican television ad.

There have been rumors that O'Neill will retire, and he turns 70 in 1982. But he is still a year younger than President Reagan, and he still seems to have a taste for the fray. He would not, one assumes, like to be minority leader, a position he last held in the Massachusetts House in 1947 and 1948. But he probably will run again. The 8th district has had considerable population loss since 1970, which means that the boundaries of the district will have to be changed, but the Democratic legislature back home will certainly draw him a district he can easily win.

Census Data Pop. (1980 final) 435,160, down 8% in 1970s. Median family income, 1970, \$10,317, 108% of U.S.


The Voters

Employment profile 1970 White collar, 63%. Blue collar, 24%. Service, 13%. Farm, —%.
Ethnic groups Black 1980, 4%. Hispanic 1980, 3%. Asian 1980, 3%. Total foreign stock 1970, 41%.
 Italy, 10%; Canada, 8%; Ireland, 6%; UK, USSR, 2% each; Portugal, Greece, Germany, Poland, 1%

Presidential Vote

1980	Reagan (R)	56,312	(31%)
	Carter (D)	92,707	(51%)
1976	Anderson (I)	28,822	(16%)
	Ford (R)	62,247	(35%)
	Carter (D)	117,446	(65%)

Rep. Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, Jr. (D) Elected 1952; b. Dec. 9, 1912, Cambridge; home, Cambridge; Boston Col., A.B. 1936.



Career Insurance business; Mass. House of Reps.; 1936-52, Minor. Ldr., 1947-48, Spkr., 1948-52; Cambridge School Comm., 1946-47.

Offices 2231 RHOB, 202-225-5111. Also 2200A JFK Fed. Bldg., Boston 02203, 617-223-2784.

Committees The Speaker of the House.

Group Ratings and Key Votes: Speaker does not usually vote

Election Results

1980 general	Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, Jr. (D) ..	128,689	(78%)	(\$62,837)
	William A. Barnstead (D)	35,477	(22%)	(\$4,829)
1980 primary	Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, Jr. (D) ..	41,782	(100%)	
1978 general	Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, Jr. (D) ..	102,160	(75%)	(\$16,274)
	William A. Barnstead (R)	28,566	(21%)	

NINTH DISTRICT

Boston is the most political of cities. Boston malcontents did more than anyone else to start the American Revolution, and Boston was the hotbed of the abolitionist movement that had so much to do with igniting the Civil War. Boston is also, and this is no coincidence, the nation's most Irish city, for the Irish seem to have some magical aptitude for politics. The proportion of Irish-Americans who live here does not really show up in the census figures, which show only the 7% who came themselves or whose parents came from Ireland; the fact is that there has been heavy Irish immigration here since 1845, and that the Boston Irish are remarkably unassimilated. In the old Irish neighborhoods of South Boston and Charlestown, people keep their ethnic identity although their ancestors may have stepped off the boat more than a century ago. This is not a city where Irish identity is forgotten.

The Irish remain the most important ethnic group in Boston; they have held the mayor's office without substantial interruption from 1906 to the present day. Much of the older Boston wealth, it is true, is still in Yankee Protestant hands, controlled by the kind of people who preserve such Boston institutions as the Athenaeum and the Somerset Club and live in

lineal) descendants of Samuel Adams and his raucous friends: the leftish, recent/former/present students, the young liberated people who make up an increasing percentage of the population here. For Boston is, if you look at it that way, the nation's largest college town, not just because of Harvard and MIT across the river in Cambridge, but because of literally hundreds of other schools of all kinds and all levels of repute. Boston is one of the few American cities where the local media, the big retailers, even the banks cater to a market of this sort.

So we have this arresting paradox. Boston, which by some indications is solidly to the left politically (more than 60% for McGovern in 1972), is also the site of the nation's longest-lasting and most bitter antibusing protest (the city went for George Wallace in the 1976 presidential primary). The way to explain the contradiction is to look at just who is upset, and at what. The antiwar movement had its constituency in the post-student generation here; the Irish neighborhoods, after initial hostility and on prompting by Edward Kennedy, concurred. Busing is a problem that troubles almost exclusively the Irish ghettos, such as South Boston, where most of the violence took place. The post-student generation has never been part of the busing controversy.

Moreover, the long-term impact of the busing controversy seems limited. The number of people whose children were affected is not all that great. Many of the whites in the city have always sent their children to Catholic schools; many others are too old to have children of school age. The busing orders that began when blacks formed only a minority of the school population have produced enough white flight that relatively few whites are left in the public school system; many have left for the suburbs, where indeed they might have moved in the natural course of things even without busing.

Certainly the evidence of election returns shows that busing is the concern of a minority. Wallace won here in 1976, but with only 25% of the vote. Mayor Kevin White twice beat Louise Day Hicks, the school committee member closely identified with opposition to busing; and the current school committee does not have a strong antibusing majority. Mrs. Hicks was elected to Congress in 1970, but with minorities in both the primary and general election. She had a minority again in the 1972 primary and lost the general election to a Democratic state senator who was running as an Independent.

That was Joseph Moakley, and he remains the congressman from the 9th district. After his initial victory, he has had no problem winning reelection. Succeeding to a seat once held by a recent Speaker, John McCormack, who served here from 1928 until his retirement in 1970, he was helped by the current Speaker, Tip O'Neill, to a seat on the House Rules Committee. Predictably his votes are in line with the wishes of the House leadership.


Moakley's district will have to be changed somewhat in redistricting. Tip O'Neill's district will probably include more of Boston than it now does, and the 9th will have to go out into more suburbs. Technically, this might put Moakley in the same district with 11th district Congressman Brian Donnelly, but in that event the chances are that Donnelly would move his residence farther out and run in the new 11th.

Census Data Pop. (1980 final) 425,958, down 10% in 1970s. Median family income, 1970, \$10,144, 106% of U.S.

The Voters

Employment profile 1970 White collar, 55%. Blue collar, 28%. Service, 17%. Farm, -%.

Maryland



... Suburbia in Control

Maryland is a little bit of everything. The ninth smallest state in the country, it manages to include within its bizarrely shaped borders a rural, traditional isolated Eastern Shore that resembles the Deep South; a mountainous north-west corner that juts into Appalachia; urban Baltimore, with the ethnicity and modern urban problems of any Northern city; and two huge, separate collections of suburbs.

But it is the suburbs that are coming to define Maryland politically. Between them, the state's two suburban Washington, D.C., counties — Montgomery and Prince George's — had more than 1.2 million people in 1980, nearly 30 percent of the population of the state. Another 638,000 live in Baltimore County, an entirely-suburban enclave just outside Baltimore, and more than 300,000 in Anne Arundel County, within commuting distance of both Baltimore and Washington.

Altogether, Maryland is now a mostly-subur-

ban constituency. But the suburbs themselves barely have more in common with each other than they do with the other parts of the state.

Baltimore County is an overwhelmingly white, blue-collar constituency, some of it Southern in orientation, conservative on social issues but loyally Democratic in most elections. Prince George's used to be something like that, but it adjoins mostly-black southeast Washington, and by 1980 it had become one-third black, moving its politics to the left but keeping its Democratic orientation.

Montgomery, on the other hand, is an upper-middle-class, white-collar area, liberal and nominally Democratic but highly independent. It strongly supports Maryland's liberal Republican senator, Charles McC. Mathias Jr.

The result of Maryland's demographic changes is a politics with little statewide coherence, in which most of the individual areas sup-

port Democrats for different reasons. Carter won it in 1980 as he was losing virtually every other state in the country. Republicans have not won the governorship since 1966, when Spiro T. Agnew was elected; they did not come close even in 1978, after Democratic incumbent Marvin Mandel had been convicted and sentenced to prison on corruption charges.

The only statewide Republican winner in the past decade has been Mathias, who has cut deeply into the Democratic vote. But there is enough of a conservative base on the Eastern Shore, in the west, and in newer suburban areas such as Anne Arundel County to convince Republicans they can win with the right candidate. They will test that theory in 1982 with a strong challenge to the junior Democratic senator, Paul S. Sarbanes.

A Political Tour

Baltimore. Until recently, Baltimore's pre-eminence within Maryland was unquestioned. Sixty years ago, the city made up half the state's population. In 1950, when the city's population peaked at just under a million, it accounted for 40 percent of the state total. But as people fled to the suburbs, Baltimore's population plummeted. Today less than 20 percent of the state's residents live there. For the first time in the city's history, the 1980 census showed the majority of them (55 percent) were black.

Despite the population decline, however, the 1970s were a good decade for Baltimore. New construction, development and rehabilitation have boosted its morale in recent years.

Physical regeneration has been aided by innovative programs such as urban homesteading — mostly residential but some commercial as well — in which the city has sold dilapidated property for a dollar. The flashy Harbor Place shopping/commercial center in the inner-harbor area has brought new life to an otherwise deserted downtown.

Baltimore is still the nation's sixth largest port. The world's largest port of entry for cars, it also handles goods ranging from iron and steel to chemicals, grain, sugar and spices. It is becoming a major coal exporting port.

Politically, Baltimore remains the Democratic base of the state. Carter, who carried the state by 45,555 votes in 1980, did it only because he took Baltimore by 134,000.

Nearly 100,000 of that margin came from the 7th Congressional District, which is nearly 80 percent black. Represented by Democrat Parren J. Mitchell, the 7th District covers the center city

and the western side of Baltimore. It was the only district in the state to support George McGovern in 1972.

The ethnic 3rd District on the south and east sides of the city is still Democratic, but with less predictability. The Poles, Italians and other blue-collar ethnics, represented in the House by Democrat Barbara Mikulski, occasionally leave their Democratic loyalties with a streak of social conservatism. They could not accept George McGovern in 1972; the district gave Richard Nixon 66 percent of its vote.

Suburban Maryland. The Baltimore suburbs are currently growing faster than those around Washington, and they are following the traditional pattern of suburban development around Northern cities. The areas closest to the city have now stopped growing. The sons and daughters of those first suburbanites are buying new homes on what was farm land a generation ago.

The Baltimore suburbs tend to be slightly less Democratic than those in the Washington area. In 1976, Gerald Ford carried all the areas closest to Baltimore, while Carter won Montgomery and Prince George's. Four years later, Carter carried Prince George's but lost both Montgomery and Baltimore counties.

Montgomery shows little real partisan affinity. In 1980, while it was going for Reagan over Carter by 20,000 votes, it gave Mathias a 136,000 vote advantage over his Democratic opponent, and re-elected its Democratic congressman by nearly 50,000 votes.

Western Republican Panhandle. Maryland's westernmost counties, settled by Pennsylvania Dutch and Scotch-Irish families, resemble neighboring Pennsylvania and West Virginia.

Dating back to the Civil War when the western panhandle sided with the North, the farmers of Western Maryland have been the most consistent Republican voters in the state. Registered Democrats still outnumber Republicans in all but Garrett County, but the margin does not come close to the statewide figure, and the registration edge is rarely reflected in the election returns.

The Republican strength in western Maryland is demonstrated every two years by the results in the 6th Congressional District. Reagan scored his highest percentage in the 6th in 1980. It was the only district J. Glenn Beall Jr. carried in his 1976 Senate loss to Sarbanes. And in 1974, both Mathias and losing GOP gubernatorial candidate Louise Gore ran more than 10 points ahead of their statewide percentages there. But the fact that only 7 percent of the state's voters live in the hilly panhandle permits a Democrat virtually to

ignore it in favor of more densely populated areas.

Eastern Shore. Around the broad and shallow Chesapeake Bay, a brand of Dixie conservatism has flourished for a long time among the farmers and fishermen.

Long tied to the Democratic Party of the Civil War era, the Eastern Shore began to entertain thoughts of voting Republican after the liberal social and economic policies of the New Deal and Fair Deal challenged its conservative instincts. The voters here flirted with George Wallace's American Independent Party in 1968. Wallace won more than 20 percent of the vote in nearly every county in the region, leaving Hubert Humphrey with the lowest vote for a Democrat since the Civil War in most Eastern Shore counties. Although Carter managed to return about half of the eastern counties to the Democratic column in 1976, by 1980 all but two — Somerset and Kent — were back in GOP hands, and Reagan missed getting those two by 97 and 30 votes, respectively. By the next presidential election, two full decades will have passed since a

Democratic candidate last carried many of the old Dixie Democratic areas of the Eastern Shore.

Redrawing the Lines

Maryland retains its eight congressional seats, but dramatic population shifts within the state make redistricting tricky. The populations of the 1st and 6th Districts, which encompass the conservative counties at the eastern and western ends of the state, have swollen to more than 600,000 each, while the two Baltimore city districts, the 3rd and the 7th, have dropped to just over 400,000.

Expanding the 7th District to preserve black Democrat Parren J. Mitchell could push Democratic incumbents in the 3rd and 2nd Districts farther from the city. As the lone GOP representative, only 4th District incumbent Marjorie S. Holt is vulnerable to a partisan gerrymander by the Democratic Legislature and governor.

Governor

Harry R. Hughes (D)

Born: Nov. 13, 1926, Easton, Md.

Home: Cross Key, Md.

Education: U. of Maryland, B.S. 1949; George Washington U. Law School, J.D. 1952.

Military Career: Navy Air Corps, 1944-45.

Profession: Lawyer.

Family: Wife, Patricia; two children.

Religion: Episcopalian.

Political Career: Md. House of Delegates, 1955-59; Md. Senate, 1959-71; unsuccessful campaign for U.S. House, 1964; secretary of Md. Dept. of Transportation, 1971-77; elected governor 1978; term expires Jan. 1983.



Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R)

Of Frederick — Elected 1968

Born: July 24, 1922, Frederick, Md.

Education: Haverford College, B.A. 1944; Yale U., 1943-44; U. of Md., LL.B. 1949.

Military Career: Navy, 1942-44.

Profession: Lawyer.

Family: Wife, Ann Hickling Bradford; two children.

Religion: Episcopalian.

Political Career: Frederick city attorney, 1954-59; Md. House, 1959-61; U.S. House, 1961-69.



In Washington: Mathias, one of the Senate's most liberal Republicans, galls his conservative colleagues to a degree wholly unwarranted by his actual influence.

The veteran Maryland senator is neither as abrasive as some of his fellow GOP liberals nor as skillful as others. Yet it is Mathias who generates the most anger on the right, and who alone among the dwindling band of Republican liberals has been punished for his political apostasy.

By all the normal rules of seniority, it is Mathias — not South Carolina's Strom Thurmond — who should now be chairman of the Judiciary Committee. But Senate Republicans did him out of it with a vindictiveness seldom displayed in the clubby world of the Senate.

The coup took place not in 1981, when Republicans gained control of the Senate, but in 1977, when a GOP takeover seemed little more than a distant dream. That year the ranking GOP position on Judiciary became vacant. Thurmond was next in line, but he was already ranking Republican on Armed Services and Senate rules prohibit anyone from holding that position on two major committees.

Thurmond's major legislative focus had been on Armed Services. But at the urging of his fellow conservatives, he gave up the top position there solely to block Mathias at Judiciary. Four years later he inherited the chairmanship. Again urged on by the Republican right, he then abolished the antitrust subcommittee Mathias was in line to head, and stripped the Criminal Justice Subcommittee, which Mathias did get, of much of its significant jurisdiction.

It was only through the insistence of Majority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. that Mathias, who is seventh in seniority among Republicans, wound up with any committee chairmanship — that of the Rules Committee, which in the Senate is largely restricted to housekeeping matters.

A more aggressive and combative man than Mathias might have forestalled the conservative assaults of recent years, but Mathias, despite the hostility he has drawn, has never been much of a political infighter. His pacific nature may even encourage attacks instead of repelling them.

But what seems to provoke conservatives most is the attention — and esteem — that Mathias has always commanded from the national media and other outsiders who consider him a principled spokesman for the moderate-to-liberal wing of the Republican Party.

Ever since he entered Congress 20 years ago, Mathias has gotten excellent press. Because he is their "local" senator, the Washington newspapers in particular tend to give him heavy coverage, most of it favorable. His differences with other Republicans — on issues ranging from the Vietnam War to civil rights and civil liberties — have been highly publicized, in a way that they would not have been if he represented Wyoming, or Vermont.

Mathias was an early and ardent critic of the Nixon administration, and during the Watergate era was prominently listed on the White House "enemies list." He voted against the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations to the Supreme Court, he opposed much of Nixon's "law and order" drive, and he spoke out early against the abuses of power associated with Watergate.

After Nixon resigned, Mathias made no conspicuous effort to move to the Republican mainstream. He began complaining regularly about the party's conservative drift, and in 1978 protested the New Right's proclivity for "cannibalizing" Republicans who disagreed with conservative doctrines.

Year in and year out, Mathias has voted against the majority of his fellow Republicans in

Charles McC. Mathias Jr., R-Md.

the Senate. By and large, however, that has been the extent of his offense; he has rarely been strident or abusive, and it is hard to think of a conservative stratagem that he has actively derailed.

Mathias is no workaholic. He is bored by details, and tends to be absent-minded. He seldom engages in the kind of painstaking effort needed to build coalitions in support of a particular bill or amendment, although he works assiduously to bring home the federal bacon for Maryland and succeeds nicely in that respect.

In the Senate as a whole, Mathias can seldom deliver any vote but his own. But on the Judiciary Committee, where ideological alliances have never coincided neatly with party lineups, he has often cast a crucial swing vote. In the years when major civil rights and civil liberties measures were moving through the committee, it was often Mathias who assured their approval, by lining up with the panel's liberal Democrats against his fellow Republicans and Southern Democrats.

More recently, he has been a swing vote on issues of a different sort. In 1980, for example, it was Mathias who cast the deciding vote to kill a proposed constitutional amendment requiring a balanced federal budget. He also voted against it in 1980 as the committee approved it.

Given the narrow 10-8 edge Republicans hold on Judiciary, and the tendency for Democrats on the committee to be more cohesive than in the past, Mathias can still play a critical role. He vowed early in 1981 to use his influence to defeat any move "to undo two decades of progress in assuring all Americans their civil rights and their civil liberties."

Besides Judiciary and Rules, Mathias serves on the Governmental Affairs Committee, where he chairs the subcommittee responsible for overseeing the District of Columbia. Like the Democrat he replaced, Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton, he supports self-government for the city — but stops short of allowing the district to tax Maryland and Virginia suburbanites who work in the city, as it would like to do.

At the start of the 97th Congress, Mathias voluntarily relinquished his seat on the powerful Appropriations Committee, where he was third in seniority, to take a much lower slot on Foreign Relations. That move dismayed the rest of the Maryland congressional delegation and many politicians in the state, who felt he should have remained on Appropriations to garner the maximum federal generosity possible for Maryland.

Mathias said he chose Foreign Relations over

Appropriations because "the development of a consistent and coherent U.S. foreign policy remains the most vital issue confronting the nation today." His landslide 1980 re-election allows him six full years in which to smooth the feathers he ruffled by switching panels.

At Home: Mathias has many of the same problems among Maryland Republicans that he has among Senate Republicans, but they have never really hurt him.

He has not offered the Republican right many concessions — he refused to serve on Ronald Reagan's Maryland steering committee in 1980 — but the party's prominent conservatives have not tried to challenge him, partly for fear that any Republican who defeated Mathias for renomination would lose the general election. Former congressman Robert E. Bauman backed down from a 1980 primary challenge to Mathias for that reason.

Democrats have never presented Mathias with much of a problem; he steals away most of their natural constituency: suburban liberals, blacks, and labor. In 1974, against liberal Democrat Barbara A. Mikulski, now a House member, Mathias captured every jurisdiction in the state except Baltimore city and suburban Baltimore County. Mikulski's edge in the city, which normally gives Democrats 100,000-vote pluralities, was a mere 28,194 votes — a testament to Mathias' personal popularity.

By 1980, Mathias had the official backing — and generous campaign support — of organized labor. He became the first Republican in modern history to win every county in the state, and Baltimore city besides. He did so while Maryland voters were giving Jimmy Carter one of his few election victories.

After four years as city attorney in his hometown of Frederick, and two years in the Maryland Legislature, Mathias ran for the House in 1960 against incumbent Democrat John R. Foley, in a district that stretched from the Washington D.C. line to the West Virginia border.

Eight years later, he challenged Democratic Sen. Daniel B. Brewster, an old friend but a highly vulnerable candidate, plagued by heavy drinking and newspaper reports linking him to a mail order scandal, in which he was later tried and convicted. Even with Brewster's problems, Mathias drew only 47.8 percent of the vote; he was helped by the candidacy of George C. Mahoney, a conservative Democrat running as an independent, who drained away some of Brewster's support.

Maryland - Senior Senator

Committees

- Foreign Relations** (6th of 9 Republicans)
International Economic Policy, chairman; African Affairs; European Affairs.
- Governmental Affairs** (4th of 9 Republicans)
Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia, chairman; Civil Service, Post Office, and General Services; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
- Judiciary** (2nd of 10 Republicans)
Criminal Law, chairman; Juvenile Justice; Regulatory Reform.
- Rules and Administration** (Chairman)
- Joint Library**
- Joint Printing** (Chairman)

Elections

1980 General	
Charles Mathias (R)	850,970 (66 %)
Edward Conroy (D)	435,118 (34 %)
1980 Primary	
Charles Mathias (R)	82,430 (55 %)
John Brennan (R)	24,848 (17 %)
Dallas Merrell (R)	23,073 (15 %)
Roscoe Bartlett (R)	10,970 (7 %)
Previous Winning Percentages	
1974 (57 %) 1968 (48 %) 1966* (71 %) 1964* (55 %)	
1962* (61 %) 1960 (52 %)	

*House elections.

Campaign Finance

	Receipts	Receipts from PACs	Expenditures
1980			
Mathias (R)	\$874,995	\$296,139 (34 %)	\$848,456
Conroy (D)	\$166,557	— (0 %)	\$162,966

Voting Studies

Year	Presidential Support		Party Unity		Conservative Coalition	
	S	O	S	O	S	O
1980	48	17	16	55	10	61
1979	73	16	23	66	22	71
1978	66	10	17	65	16	69
1977	64	19	25	60	30	60
1976	40	42	20	59	20	64

Year	43	37	22	60	14	71
1975	43	37	22	60	14	71
1974 (Ford)	32	40				
1974	39	40	14	60	10	63
1973	43	42	28	58	31	59
1972	41	50	35	53	33	59
1971	44	40	38	51	36	49
1970	51	27	27	46	21	49
1969	57	21	27	52	28	54
House service						
1968	50	22	26	41	24	47
1967	47	20	27	45	13	44
1966	50	18	35	33	30	46
1965	48	22	34	48	27	55
1964	54	27	35	44	33	58
1963	56	32	45	46	20	80
1962	70	25	47	49	31	69
1961	57	42	66	34	52	48

S = Support

O = Opposition

Key Votes

96th Congress

- Maintain relations with Taiwan (1979) N
- Reduce synthetic fuel development funds (1979) N
- Impose nuclear plant moratorium (1979) N
- Kill stronger windfall profits tax (1979) N
- Guarantee Chrysler Corp. loans (1979) Y
- Approve military draft registration (1980) N
- End Revenue Sharing to the states (1980) N
- Block Justice Dept. busing suits (1980) ?

97th Congress

- Restore urban program funding cuts (1981) Y

Interest Group Ratings

Year	ADA	ACA	APL-CIO	CCUS-1	CCUS-2
Senate service					
1980	72	8	100	46	
1979	63	15	79	18	33
1978	50	22	76	25	
1977	75	14	79	18	
1976	65	5	67	0	
1975	83	15	85	36	
1974	86	0	80	11	
1973	90	4	60	22	
1972	60	32	80	33	
1971	63	21	58	-	
1970	78	15	83	33	
1969	78	7	18	-	
House service					
1968	50	36	75	-	
1967	53	26	83	38	
1966	41	50	31	-	
1965	53	36	-	60	
1964	72	38	82	-	
1963	-	50	-	-	
1962	88	48	45	-	
1961	30	-	-	-	

Michael D. Barnes, D-Md.

Jr. and Gilbert Gude. Steers took Barnes too lightly, and lost by 4,000 votes out of nearly 160,000 cast.

Stunned by his defeat, Steers campaigned intensively for a rematch in 1980, and raised \$565,000. But Barnes had cultivated a reputation as an independent-minded, energetic congressman. He was a leader of the unsuccessful movement in the summer of 1980 to "open" the Democratic National Convention so that delegates bound to President Jimmy Carter would be free to vote for someone else. His work did not shake loose many of the delegates bound to Carter, but it did not hurt Barnes a bit at home; in November, he was re-elected by nearly 50,000 votes while Reagan was carrying the district by 20,000.

Before launching his career in elective politics, Barnes was a lawyer. But he had also been active in national party affairs. He was an aide to Sen. Edmund S. Muskie's 1972 presidential cam-

paigned and executive director of the 1976 National Democratic Platform Committee.

The District: The 8th is far above the rest of the state in median family income and percentage of white-collar workers. Many of its upper-middle and high-income families work for the federal government, or as lawyers in Washington, or for the hundreds of trade associations and other government-related groups that have sprung up in the area in the past two decades. Several electronics and computer companies operate in the inner suburban communities of Bethesda, Silver Spring and Wheaton, and others have blossomed along Interstate 270 to the northwest, in Rockville and Gaithersburg.

Despite a hefty Democratic registration advantage, the 8th has a history of quirky ticket-splitting. In 1976, Carter and Republican Steers carried the district. In 1980, it was won by Reagan and Democrat Barnes.

Committees

District of Columbia (6th of 7 Democrats)
Government Operations and Metropolitan Affairs.

Foreign Affairs (13th of 21 Democrats)
Inter-American Affairs, chairman; Human Rights and International Organizations.

Elections

1980 General

Michael Barnes (D)	148,301 (59 %)
Newton Steers Jr. (R)	101,659 (41 %)

1978 General

Michael Barnes (D)	81,851 (51 %)
Newton Steers Jr. (R)	77,807 (49 %)

1978 Primary

Michael Barnes (D)	36,540 (72 %)
Alfred Muller (D)	6,175 (12 %)

District Vote For President

	1980		1976		1972
D	100,946 (40 %)	D	126,116 (52 %)	D	96,643 (43 %)
R	120,478 (47 %)	R	117,949 (48 %)	R	127,225 (56 %)
I	31,674 (12 %)				

Campaign Finance

	Receipts	Receipts from PACs	Expenditures
1980			
Barnes (D)	\$348,801	\$113,514 (33 %)	\$349,924
Steers (R)	\$563,694	\$42,255 (7 %)	\$565,952

Voting Studies

1978

Barnes (D)	\$136,244	\$37,178 (27 %)	\$134,000
Steers (R)	\$165,669	\$49,330 (30 %)	\$162,000

Year	Presidential Support		Party Unity		Conservative Coalition	
	S	O	S	O	S	O
1980	76	20	85	9	5	87
1979	80	20	93	6	6	93

S = Support O = Opposition

Key Votes


- 96th Congress**
- Weakens Carter oil profits tax (1979) N
 - Reject hospital cost control plan (1979) N
 - Implement Panama Canal Treaties (1979) Y
 - Establish Department of Education (1979) N
 - Approve Anti-busing Amendment (1979) N
 - Guarantee Chrysler Corp. loans (1979) N
 - Approve military draft registration (1980) Y
 - Aid Sandinista regime in Nicaragua (1980) Y
 - Strengthen fair housing laws (1980) Y

97th Congress
Reagan budget proposal (1981) N

Interest Group Ratings

Year	ADA	ACA	AFL-CIO	CCNY
1980	94	13	82	61
1979	89	8	95	6

Massachusetts



STATE:

Governor

Edward J. King (D)

General Court

Senate: 40 members (32D, 7R, 1IND.)
House: 160 members (128D, 31R, 1IND.)

Population

5,737,137 - 11th in the nation

Area

8,257 sq. miles - 45th in the nation

1980 Presidential Vote: Carter (42%), Reagan (42%), Anderson (15%)

... Joining the Majority

"Don't blame me, I'm from Massachusetts," bumper stickers said in 1973, after things began to go wrong in the second Nixon term that all 49 other states had voted for the previous November. It was a satisfying collective smirk. But if things should go wrong in any sense in the current Republican administration, Massachusetts will have to share the blame with 43 other states. The only state to support George McGovern in 1972 went for Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Reagan's victory does not signal any pendulum swing to the right in Massachusetts. The Republican won by only 6,000 votes out of 2.5 million cast, with 42 percent of the total vote. Independent candidate John Anderson's 15 percent — his highest in the nation — greatly hurt Carter.

Yet there is an indication of growing dissatisfaction with high taxes and liberal "big government" programs. The 1978 election of conserva-

tive Gov. Edward King, who had unseated liberal incumbent Michael Dukakis in the Democratic primary, was a warning. Passage in 1980 of "Proposition, 2 1/2" placing a ceiling on local property taxes and leading to reduced services in communities all over the state, was an even more dramatic symbol that Massachusetts is more complicated than the liberal state of the Kennedys.

If the Kennedys have been the source of modern Massachusetts liberalism, they have also been the beneficiaries of broader change in the state's politics. In 1947, when John Kennedy first took a seat in Congress, Massachusetts had a Republican Governor and two Republican Senators, and the GOP held nine of the state's 14 House seats. In 1981, with Edward Kennedy nearing the end of his third full term in the Senate, his party holds the governorship, both Senate seats, and 10 of 12 House seats.

What the Kennedys did was give leadership

to issue-oriented liberals and legitimacy to a party previously associated with machine politics and corruption. They helped tame the fierce rivalry between the Yankee Protestant Republicans and Catholic Democrats.

Irish Democrats were running Boston by the turn of the century, and beginning in the 1920s, the party was competitive statewide in good national Democratic years. The Depression created a stable majority for Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. But Yankee Republicans continued to win most congressional and gubernatorial elections, helped by their increased willingness to nominate candidates from the "progressive" side of the spectrum, like Leverett Saltonstall and Henry Cabot Lodge.

When John F. Kennedy first ran for Congress in 1946, the state was nearly ready for a political upheaval, with or without him. It soon had one, symbolized not only by Kennedy's Senate victory over Lodge in 1952 but by the Democratic takeover of the legislature in 1948, which installed Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. as Speaker of the state House. The legislature has not been Republican since.

Over the following decades, Massachusetts became a national leader in state spending for welfare, unemployment insurance and other social programs. Democrats did not win every election — internecine party warfare, particularly between Irish and Italian Americans, plagued them into the 1970s — but Republican winners, such as Edward Brooke, the only black senator since Reconstruction, were progressives.

Problems developed, though. Recessions and the decline of the textile and shoe industries left many cities in a state of near-depression. Irish South Boston exploded in violence in 1975 over busing plans involving blacks from Roxbury. Catholic opposition to Massachusetts' liberal abortion laws grew. Taxes to pay for expensive social programs soared, angering millions and sending thousands packing for low-tax New Hampshire.

In 1978, angry Democrats gave a jolt to the liberal "welfare state" policies by dumping Dukakis for Edward King. That same year, Democrat Paul Tsongas unseated two-term Sen. Brooke. By 1980, Tsongas had adapted to current realities by calling for a "new liberalism" to replace what he saw as the dogma of huge spending programs and high taxes.

Political Tour

Boston. Boston was getting shabby for some years after World War II. But urban renewal

instituted by Mayor John Collins (1960-1968) and Kevin White (1968-) has transformed the city into one of the most amenable (and expensive) places in the nation to live.

The city's population, which peaked just above 800,000 in 1950, had by 1980 fallen back to where it was at the turn of the century — slightly more than 560,000. But the population slide shows signs of abating and new urban shopping precincts, such as the glittery Faneuil Hall market, have given new life to the center city.

Boston is unquestionably a Democratic city. Only three Republicans have carried it over the last two decades, all from the liberal wing of the party — John Volpe in 1966, Francis Sargent in 1970, and Brooke in 1972. But each of them also lost the city at some other time to Democrats more liberal than they. Kennedy regularly wins seven of every ten votes in the city, and in 1972, George McGovern took a healthy 66 percent — better than either of Jimmy Carter's victories there.

Boston is best defined by its various ethnic neighborhoods. South Boston is the heart of the Irish Catholic vote in the city. Although historically Democratic, South Boston supported Reagan in 1980 over Jimmy Carter. In the wake of violent anti-busing demonstrations in the 1970s, South Boston's political debate now centers on social rather than economic questions, and that favors conservative candidates. George Wallace swept South Boston in the 1976 Democratic presidential primary.

Blacks make up about a fifth of the city's population. Concentrated in Roxbury and the South End, Boston's blacks regularly give as much as 90 percent of their vote to Democratic candidates. The North End and East Boston are heavily Italian.

Thousands of college students attending Boston University, Northeastern University, and numerous smaller institutions have also had a profound effect on politics within the city. Activated by opposition to the Vietnam war and permitted to vote on campus by liberal registration laws, the student community has provided the volunteer force and votes for many liberal candidates at both the state and local level.

Suburban Boston. Boston has several sets of suburbs that form concentric circles around the city's north, west and south sides.

Just north of Boston are Cambridge, Watertown and Somerville, three communities that are essentially urban extensions of Boston. All have strong ethnic, blue-collar populations and are Democratic. Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology give Cambridge a more

liberal flavor than the others. House Speaker O'Neill has represented Cambridge for 29 years; his early stand against the Vietnam war was popular at home even when it was controversial in national politics.

Brookline and Newton immediately to the west of Boston have large enclaves of wealthy, liberal, Jewish residents. Just south of Boston are Dedham, Milton and Quincy, where shipbuilding and other industries exist near ethnic, blue-collar neighborhoods.

The next ring of towns farther out from the Hub, as Boston is called, have been traditionally dependent on small-scale industries which have suffered in the second third of the 20th century. As shoe-making and textile work died out, the Democratic workers moved into machine factories. In turn, the machines have given way to high technology. Route 128, a ring road around Boston, has served as a magnet for numerous electronics, defense and space-related firms. With a highly-educated work force, these clean, white-collar industries have brought a new measure of economic prosperity to the area.

Route 128 is a rough dividing line between the "urban" suburbs close to Boston and those that are more countryfied. The strong Democratic vote found inside Route 128 wavers in the suburban towns further from Boston, particularly when Republicans nominate liberal candidates like Brooke and Sargent. Residential communities such as Belmont, Lexington, and Winchester support a strong GOP tradition. Further from the city, on the North Shore, Marblehead is heavily Republican but the fishing town of Gloucester and industrial Beverly are more divided between the parties. Salem, of witch trial fame, is a Democratic industrial town. Residents of these communities read Boston's newspapers and watch its television stations, but many of them have little day-to-day contact with the city.

Northern Industrial. Lowell, Lawrence and Haverhill are aging Massachusetts factory towns. Lowell and Lawrence were great cities of textile manufacturing; Haverhill was a leader in shoemaking. The decline of these industries set the cities back drastically but they are beginning to re-emerge as viable economic entities, bolstered by the arrival of new high-technology industry.

Large enough to qualify as a metropolitan area in its own right, the industrial region of Lawrence and Lowell is strongly Democratic. In 1978, King and Tsongas both won more than 70 percent in Lowell and Lawrence. Two years later, Carter carried both cities over Ronald Reagan, but by a less impressive margin.

Heading towards the ocean, northeast Massa-

chusetts is dotted with small towns and fishing villages that often vote Republican.

Southern Industrial. Bordering on Rhode Island is Bristol County, site of two of Massachusetts' larger cities: New Bedford and Fall River. Like the cities at the northern end of the Boston sphere, New Bedford and Fall River suffered blight and high unemployment following the disappearance of major employers.

The economies of both cities were based on textiles, fishing and whaling. With the decline of all three industries, many jobs vanished and there has been little to fill the void.

Seafaring Portuguese-Americans settled in Fall River years ago and have remained an important part of the city's ethnic makeup. New Bedford also has a large Portuguese population. Both cities support Democrats regularly, although the large blue-collar constituency tends to favor moderates, such as Sen. Henry Jackson, over liberals. Jackson was an easy winner in both cities in his 1976 Democratic presidential primary bid.

Cape Cod and Coastal Towns. The old Yankee personality that once dominated the entire state is still alive and well on much of Cape Cod. The area is largely dependent on the thousands of tourists who come to walk on its dunes and beaches every year. It is also one of the nation's major cranberry growing areas, and fishing is still a lively industry.

Running from Cohasset and Scituate in the north to Provincetown at the tip of the Cape, and including the islands of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket, this region is quite Republican by Massachusetts standards. The four counties that make up the area — Plymouth, Barnstable, Dukes and Nantucket — all supported Nixon in 1972 when the state went for McGovern. In 1980, Reagan carried all but Dukes County (Martha's Vineyard). On the congressional level, however, the area now sends liberal Democrat Gerry Studds to the House virtually without opposition. In the 1960s, Republican Hastings Keith won without any opposition.

This is a lightly populated region with slightly more than a half-million people in 1980. But it grew by a nearly third between 1970 and 1980, more than any other part of the state.

Central and Western Massachusetts. With a few notable exceptions, this is Yankee Massachusetts, where the town meeting and the village green are more reminiscent of Vermont than of Boston.

There are a few industrial centers, but most of central and western Massachusetts is taken up

by the Berkshire Hills and small farms which specialize in dairy cattle, chickens, apples and cigar tobacco.

Republicans often do better among the farmers and villagers in this area than with the ethnic working-classes in the eastern part of the state. A moderate Republican, Silvio Conte, has represented western Massachusetts in Congress for 22 years.

The Democratic vote is centered in the major cities. Worcester, in east-central Massachusetts, is the state's second largest city with 162,000 people. Industry is dominant and diversified; the vote is strongly Democratic. Other industrial Democratic cities in Worcester County are Fitchburg and Leominster. The latter supported Reagan in 1980.

Springfield is the third-ranking city in the state. With 152,000 people, it is the Massachusetts focal point of the Connecticut River Valley industrial area, which also includes the cities of Holyoke and Chicopee. All the industrial cities and towns generally vote Democratic, though suburbs like West Springfield and Westfield sometimes go Republican.

There are numerous French-Canadians in the Springfield metropolitan area. They have been the largest immigrant group in the post-war era, but their numbers and political power do not compare with other ethnic groups.

A few large towns in the remainder of western

Massachusetts bring mixed political results. North of Springfield are the college towns of Northampton (Smith College) and Amherst (University of Massachusetts, Amherst College), where Democrats and Republicans are fairly evenly matched. Pittsfield, in Berkshire County, has some industry, but it is neither as "ethnic" nor as Democratic as eastern Massachusetts.

Redrawing the Lines

Sluggish overall growth during the 1970s dropped Massachusetts from the ten most populous states for the first time in history. It also cost the state its 12th seat in the House. Any one of the Boston-area districts — the 7th, 8th, 9th or 11th — could be cut. All of them lost population in the last decade and are far short of the ideal district size of 521,549. But the Boston districts are all Democratic, and instead of consolidating in Boston, Democrats at midyear were discussing carving up the overpopulated 10th District of GOP Rep. Margaret M. Heckler.

The coastal 12th District of southeastern Massachusetts far outpaced the rest of the state in population growth during the 1970s. To a lesser extent, Heckler's nearby 10th District shared in the boom, as did the 1st, 3rd and 5th Districts, which grew modestly.

Governor Edward J. King (D)

Born: May 11, 1925, Chelsea, Mass.
Home: Winthrop, Mass.
Education: Boston College, B.A. 1948.
Military Career: Navy.
Profession: Museum administrator, Mass. Port Authority executive director, 1963-74.
Family: Wife, Josephine; two children.
Religion: Roman Catholic.
Political Career: Elected governor 1978; term expires Jan. 1983.



Edward M. Kennedy (D)

Of Boston — Elected 1962

Born: Feb. 22, 1932, Boston, Mass.
Education: Harvard U., A.B. 1956; U. of Va., LL.B. 1959.
Military Career: Army, 1951-53.
Profession: Lawyer.
Family: Separated; three children.
Religion: Roman Catholic.
Political Career: Suffolk County assistant district attorney, 1962-61; south Democratic nomination for president, 1980.



In Washington: Kennedy has been preoccupied with national politics much of his career, but he still has been the legislator neither of his brothers ever had time to be. Over nearly 20 years, he has won his share of small battles and made symbolic issues out of the larger ones.

His cause now is the defense of social programs Reagan wants to eliminate or reduce. Many fall within the scope of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, where Kennedy has served throughout his Senate career. That was one reason he chose to take the senior Democratic position on Labor and Human Resources in 1981, rather than the one on Judiciary, which he could have chosen instead.

He has spoken out against Reagan on the full spectrum of budget and social policy issues. In June, he led the Senate as it rebuked the administration for refusing to support a worldwide campaign against the marketing of unhealthy baby formulas in Third World countries.

Still, he is a minority senator for the first time in his career, only two years after he seemed to be on the verge of real power as Judiciary chairman. When Kennedy took over at Judiciary, his tenure seemed likely to last as long as he wanted to remain in the Senate. But he did not accomplish much. By the fall of 1979, he was running for president and spending little time on committee business.

His first priority, an artful compromise with Judiciary's senior Republican, Strom Thurmond, on a bill to rewrite the U.S. criminal code, fell apart when Kennedy let his Senate duties lapse. The code never reached the floor. After the 1980 election, Kennedy returned to committee work and tried desperately to rescue an open housing bill that had already passed the House. But it failed when conservatives threatened to filibuster.

Kennedy started his Senate career without any of the leadership pressures that descended on him later. He was 30 years old, his brothers were

running the country, and he voted with them while looking out for Massachusetts' interests.

In the next few years, Kennedy became a creative and often successful legislator. He was largely responsible for creating the Teacher Corps; he fought against draft deferments for college students, arguing that they were unfair to the poor, and helped bring about their elimination; he worked to draw up rules for congressional redistricting. He spoke for Hispanic farm workers in California and Indians in Alaska.

But Kennedy's strongest legislative period came in the early 1970s, following not only the Chappaquiddick tragedy in 1969 but his most embarrassing Senate defeat, his removal as majority whip in 1971.

Kennedy had been elected whip in 1969, defeating Senate Finance Chairman Russell B. Long, who had performed erratically in the post for four years. The vote was taken only months after Robert Kennedy's assassination, and the youngest Kennedy was seen as the rising liberal star.

But he was too impatient to do the odd jobs on the Senate floor that make an effective Senate leader. And that summer, his image was shattered when he drove off a bridge at Chappaquiddick and Mary Jo Kopechne drowned. When Senate Democrats met to elect their leaders in 1971, they chose Robert C. Byrd for whip, 31-24.

That led Kennedy back into the legislative process. He became chairman of the Health Subcommittee, and formed a productive partnership with his House counterpart, Florida Democrat Paul G. Rogers. Together they wrote legislation providing new federal money for research into cancer and heart and lung diseases, family planning, and doctor training. Virtually every year brought a greater federal role in health.

But there still was resistance to Kennedy's

announced his retirement in 1976, after serving 21 years in the House, virtually everyone with any political base thought about running. By the time MacDonald died, six weeks later, there were a dozen candidates scrambling to succeed him.

It was clear that a primary with that many aspirants would be decided mostly by simple name identification. Markey already had quite a bit. Elected to the state Legislature while still in law school, he had received a fair amount of attention for his arguments with the Democratic leadership. That helped him in the primary, as did his endorsement from Michael J. Harrington, who represented the adjoining area in the House.

Markey lost three of the four largest towns in the district to favorite sons, but won his own hometown, Malden, and six of the remaining 11. That gave him 21.4 percent, considerably more than he needed to defeat runner-up Joseph Croken, a longtime administrative aide to

MacDonald.


The 22,137 votes Markey received in the primary all but guaranteed his future. Since then he has faced only two opponents — a Republican who ran as a write-in in 1976, and an obscure primary challenger who won 15 percent in 1980.

The District: This is the most Democratic of the districts outside Boston. It is made up of 14 towns and cities, all within Route 128, once considered the outer limit of Boston's sphere of influence. The largest communities are those along the Mystic River, close to the city limits. Malden, Medford, Revere and Everett cast more than half the vote. Although suburban, these are older, blue-collar towns, many with a strong Italian influence. They are difficult to distinguish from some of the ethnic neighborhoods within Boston. George Wallace ran second to Henry Jackson here in the 1976 presidential primary.

8 Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D)

Of Cambridge — Elected 1952

Born: Dec. 9, 1912, Cambridge, Mass.
Education: Boston College, A.B. 1936.
Profession: Insurance broker.
Family: Wife, Mildred Anne Miller; five children.
Religion: Roman Catholic.
Political Career: Mass. House, 1937-53, Speaker, 1949-53; unsuccessful candidate for Cambridge City Council, 1936.



In Washington: "Tip" O'Neill has emerged as a living symbol of the politics the Reagan administration wants to change.

Republicans invoke his name and even his beefy Irish face in campaigning on an anti-government theme. O'Neill himself has seemed willing to accept the role, admitting he is a big spender and talking emotionally of the "people programs" being threatened.

But it requires at least a minor rewriting of history to blame O'Neill — or credit him — for most of the government programs now under siege.

For 24 years before he was elected Speaker, O'Neill was a man interested almost exclusively in the pure politics of the House. As a member of the Rules Committee, he helped broker procedural deals that brought major bills to the floor. And he voted for them loyally. But he was no architect. He spent half of every week in Cambridge, doing personal favors for constituents the way Boston politicians always have.

O'Neill came to the House in 1953, a cigar-smoking, poker-playing Red Sox fan of 41, proud of his great success in politics. He had engineered Democratic triumphs at home and was his party's first Speaker of the Massachusetts House in the 20th century.

In Congress, O'Neill went on the Public Works Committee, to make sure Massachusetts got its share of federal jobs and projects. But he served only one term there. When Democrats reclaimed Congress after the 1954 elections, he was named to Rules. He still tells a story of meeting with Speaker Rayburn: "He says... you know what loyalty is. I says that's right. He says... I would expect you to get votes for me. I says that's party loyalty. He says you're going on the Rules Committee."

In 18 years on Rules, O'Neill nearly always supported the Speaker, whoever he happened to

be, but he was seen more as a loyal soldier than as a potential House leader himself.

Along the way, however, O'Neill was performing the kind of service that wins friends and supporters for the future. He kept track of things. From his Rules seat, he knew when bills were coming up, what amendments were proposed and by whom. He could warn members of key votes and tell them when nothing of importance was scheduled. He looked out for the other Tuesday-Thursday congressmen of the urban Northeast.

Those favors alone would not have made him Speaker. Success required an unusual combination of circumstances, and two shrewd moves.

One was in foreign policy. In late 1967, O'Neill suddenly broke with President Johnson and came out publicly against the Vietnam War, which he said was "too high a price to pay for an obscure and limited objective." It angered Johnson, but it pleased students at the 22 colleges and universities in O'Neill's district. It also began to set O'Neill apart from other big-city ethnic Democrats in the minds of younger House liberals.

Three years later, O'Neill worked with that same generation of House liberals on a major reform in House procedure. As a member of the Rules Committee he sponsored the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, allowing recorded votes on major floor amendments for the first time. O'Neill did not initiate the changes, but he

8th District: Boston and suburbs, Cambridge. Population: 435,160 (8% decrease since 1970). Race: White 397,592 (91%), Black 17,387 (4%), Asian and Pacific Islander 12,800 (3%), Others 7,381 (2%). Spanish origin: 12,921 (3%).

Committees

Energy and Commerce (10th of 24 Democrats)
 Energy Conservation and Power: Fossil and Synthetic Fuels; Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance.

Interior and Insular Affairs (12th of 23 Democrats)
 Oversight and Investigations, Chairman; Energy and the Environment.

Elections

1980 General
 Edward Markey (D) Unopposed

1980 Primary
 Edward Markey (D) 29,190 (85%)
 James Murphy (D) 5,247 (15%)

1978 General
 Edward Markey (D) 145,615 (85%)
 James Murphy (I) 26,017 (15%)

Previous Winning Percentages

1976 (77%)

District Vote For President

Year	D	R	I
1980	91,189 (42%)	126,935 (57%)	122,026 (57%)
1976	90,726 (42%)	86,572 (39%)	91,617 (43%)
1972	30,656 (14%)		

Campaign Finance

Year	Receipts	Receipts from PACs	Expenditures
1980			
Markey (D)	\$114,941	\$26,775 (23%)	\$67,173

1978

Markey (D)	61,508	12,060 (20%)	60,500
------------	--------	--------------	--------

Voting Studies

Year	Presidential Support		Party Unity		Conservative Coalition	
	S	O	S	O	S	O
1980	71	24	88	9	8	84
1979	83	14	88	10	8	90
1978	79	18	83	13	3	93
1977	75	24	87	12	11	88

S = Support O = Opposition

Key Votes

96th Congress

Weaken Carter oil profits tax (1979)	N
Reject hospital cost control plan (1979)	N
Implement Panama Canal Treaties (1979)	Y
Establish Department of Education (1979)	Y
Approve Anti-busing Amendment (1979)	N
Guarantee Chrysler Corp. loans (1979)	Y
Approve military draft registration (1980)	N
Aid Sandinista regime in Nicaragua (1980)	Y
Strengthen fair housing laws (1980)	Y

97th Congress
 Reagan budget proposal (1981)

Interest Group Ratings

Year	ADA	ACA	AFL-CIO	COM
1980	83	22	84	63
1979	95	8	95	6
1978	90	7	85	22
1977	90	8	78	18

fought for them and gave them credibility among more traditionalist members of the party. It contributed to O'Neill's new image as a machine Democrat with a reformist streak.

That image placed him on the leadership ladder as Democratic Whip in 1971. O'Neill had been one of the first to sign up Massachusetts Democrats in support of the man certain to be elected Speaker that year, Carl Albert. When Albert and Majority Leader Hale Boggs disagreed over whom to pick for whip, they both thought of O'Neill — loyal, popular, and by that time, a perfect choice to soothe the competing factions of young reformers and old regulars.

In October, 1972, a small plane carrying Boggs and three others disappeared into the icy wilderness of Alaska. O'Neill wanted to be certain no one moved ahead of him up the ladder to majority leader. At the same time, he did not want to appear insensitive. Boggs was listed only as missing, not dead. Finally, Mrs. Boggs (who later took her husband's seat in Congress) assured O'Neill it was all right to start lining up votes, and O'Neill went to work. By the time other Democrats thought about running, O'Neill had more than enough commitments to win.

Majority leaders nearly always become Speaker unless they do something wrong. O'Neill did nothing wrong. When Albert retired in 1976, Democrats picked him for Speaker by acclamation. O'Neill got off to a fast start in 1977 by pushing through the House a tough ethics code and by skillfully maneuvering to win passage of President Carter's package of energy conservation and oil pricing bills. He was commended as a man of sound political instincts who could handle the often delicate egos of House members. He was the strongest Speaker, it was said, since Rayburn.

In personal terms, that has remained true. O'Neill has a physical presence and a forcefulness that contrasts sharply with his two predecessors, Albert and the late John W. McCormack of Massachusetts.

But he has found himself without a real majority to command. Even in the 95th and 96th Congresses, with a nearly 2-1 partisan Democratic advantage, he was unable to prevent Republicans from drawing 50 or more Democratic votes and winning on crucial decisions. "I've got a lot of good friends out there," O'Neill said bitterly one frustrating night in 1980, "who won't even give me a vote to adjourn."

And in 1981, with the Democrats holding only a 53-seat advantage, O'Neill became a virtual captive in the Speaker's chair. No amount of personal pleading or arm-twisting was sufficient to prevent Southern Democrats from voting the

Reagan position, as constituents urged them to do. The Speaker lost vote after vote on budget issues. "I have never seen anything like this in my life," he said at one point.

O'Neill has not handled the budget issue well. Never convinced that a balanced budget was very important, he declined to participate in early 1980 when other House leaders sat down with Carter administration officials to try to write one. Later he endorsed their work, but ultimately opposed a House-Senate budget compromise because it was too stingy to social programs.

In 1981 he took his usual springtime foreign tour, this one to Australia, while other Democrats were lobbying to stave off a Reagan budget victory. When he returned he announced that Reagan could not be beaten, an observation that turned out to be true but struck some colleagues as an abdication of leadership. Talk began to circulate about a retirement in 1982, although the Speaker denied it.

Beneath the frustration, though, O'Neill has seemed confident that something will snap somewhere and his old fashioned flag-waving Democratic political world will be back in style. He refuses to concede that Reagan conservatism will persist. The pendulum has swung to the right, he agrees, but it will swing back again: it has happened before.

At Home: Although O'Neill thrives on the politics of the House, it is politics in the Irish and Italian wards of Cambridge and Boston that brings his exuberance into full bloom. Taking his "ethnic walk" through the shops of his district or attending the wake of a constituent, O'Neill still displays the political talent that has been winning him elections in his hometown since 1936.

In the years since he replaced John F. Kennedy in the House, he has campaigned with more gusto than the political situation seemed to require. He had only token GOP opponents in his first four elections. Since then, only two Republicans have even bothered to run. One, William A. Barnstead, has become a professional O'Neill antagonist, challenging him three times in a row. But no opponent has ever received 30 percent.

O'Neill's only political defeat came in 1936 when he was a senior at Boston College. He lost Cambridge City Council seat by 150 votes. Undermined, he ran that fall for the state House and won. He remained there 16 years and ran an insurance business on the side. But business was secondary. Politics came first.

In 1947 he became minority leader and the following year, Democrats captured the state House for the first time in 100 years. O'Neill

became Speaker. He was a tough leader, even ruthless. Tales are told on Beacon Hill of O'Neill locking the chamber doors to prevent members from "taking a walk" on crucial votes. But his firm control of the chamber resulted in the passage of social programs referred to as "The Little New Deal."

In 1951 Kennedy told O'Neill privately he planned to give up his House seat to run for the Senate. O'Neill began expanding his political base to include all of Kennedy's congressional district. To win, he had to defeat East Boston's state Sen. Michael LoPresti Sr. in the primary. It was a hard-fought campaign, centering mostly on ethnic and geographical rivalries. O'Neill's support in Cambridge gave him a narrow victory.

O'Neill's opposition to the war in Vietnam and support for Eugene McCarthy's 1968 presidential campaign earned him a loyal following on the numerous campuses in the district. But his

stand was less popular in the blue-collar areas which account for a much larger portion of the vote. "My strength has always been the workmen in the back streets," O'Neill once said. "I had to sell them and I had a helluva time."

The District: The combination of blue-collar ethnics and university-connected liberals makes this the most solidly Democratic district in the state. The working class voters in Watertown, Somerville and the part of Cambridge furthest from Harvard Yard vote as close to a straight party line as one finds among white voters anywhere in the North. George McGovern won 65 percent of the vote here in 1972.

The district also includes a sizable portion of Boston. It has fashionable Back Bay, plus Allston and Brighton, two areas dominated by middle-class row houses and student apartments. Italian East Boston and Irish Charlestown are part of O'Neill's district as well.

Committees

Speaker of the House

Elections

1980 General			
Thomas O'Neill Jr. (D)	128,689	(78 %)	
William Barnstead (R)	35,477	(22 %)	
1978 General			
Thomas O'Neill Jr. (D)	102,160	(75 %)	
William Barnstead (R)	28,566	(21 %)	
Previous Winning Percentages			
1976 (74 %)	1974 (88 %)	1972 (89 %)	1970 (100%)
1968 (100%)	1966 (100%)	1964 (100%)	1962 (73 %)
1960 (100%)	1958 (80 %)	1956 (75 %)	1954 (78 %)
1952 (69 %)			

District Vote For President

1980		1976		1972	
D	92,707 (51 %)	D	117,446 (62 %)	D	127,868 (66 %)
R	56,312 (31 %)	R	62,247 (33 %)	R	65,660 (34 %)
I	28,812 (16 %)				

Campaign Finance

	Receipts	Receipts from PACs	Expenditures
1980			
O'Neill (D)	\$67,825	\$59,500 (88 %)	\$62,837
Barnstead (R)	\$5,445	\$200 (4 %)	\$4,829

Voting Studies

Year	Presidential Support		Party Unity		Conservative Coalition	
	S	O	S	O	S	O
1976	33	59	82	5	15	69
1975	40	56	84	6	15	76
1974 (Ford)	46	44				
1974	51	42	79	8	16	73
1973	31	63	86	8	21	74
1972	49	38	81	7	9	80
1971	46	51	85	7	20	74
1970	66	28	79	11	7	73
1969	53	36	84	7	13	84
1968	79	6	84	1	4	88
1967	72	6	82	4	4	83
1966	64	3	70	4	3	65
1965	80	5	84	5	4	86
1964	90	4	89	2	8	92
1963	83	4	91	0	7	60

S = Support O = Opposition

Interest Group Ratings

Year	ADA	ACA	AFL-CIO	CCUS
1976	60	8	87	13
1975	74	8	100	12
1974	65	8	100	11
1973	76	16	91	27
1972	69	5	90	0
1971	78	11	91	-
1970	76	6	100	0
1969	87	6	100	-
1968	83	5	100	-
1967	87	8	92	20
1966	88	0	92	-
1965	79	4	-	20
1964	88	0	100	-
1963	-	0	-	-