

TW: The first few days the fellows were taken we stayed up here around the clock. That had been off and on, but we certainly were doing that after they got out of jail until they were out of the country. There are a couple of kind of interesting things from our point of view. We made an arrangement that they would call one of our Iranian employees to report progress and we made a decision, as I recall, not to tell the Iranian that he would be used that way because we didn't want to run up any red flags at all. So, after they left Tehran is when this communications developed. The communications problem was basically one of the operators in Iran just refused to handle any U.S. calls. It was a boycott. They disabled the automatic equipment and they just wouldn't handle U.S. calls except for very, very few. So, there was just no way to get a call through. As it turns out, we would have had more of a panic around here than we had because they were to call as they got near the border, which they planned to make the first evening. They planned to go all the way to the border the first day, and we expected them to call back to Tehran from a town near the border the same night they left Tehran. It turns out that they were detained. It was late that night before they got a call back to Tehran. We probably would have panicked if we had gotten through to Tehran and they hadn't heard from them. Fortunately, we were delayed in getting our call through to Tehran so we didn't know where they were until we got a delayed call.

KF: I think you are mistaken about the time they were due to get to the border. They were due to get to the border by midnight the second day, but they were due to call you by midnight on the first day, and in fact, they had trouble making that call.

TW: Right. That's correct, but as I recall, the plan was that they had hoped to get to a town near the border the first day, and then planning to cross the following day and as it turns out they didn't get to Reziah until the second night at the time they should have already been across.

KF: Well, they got across at half-past midnight on the second day, which was . . .

TW: But they got there by the wrong schedule, I guess is what I'm trying to say. The plan to spend the night at Reziah and then cross the next day . . . well, they got detained the first night on the way and so they were behind schedule, but they ended up getting there at basically that time.

KF: So, really people here were just sitting by the phone, I suppose?

TW: Yeah, we were.

KF: There wasn't much else for you to do.

TW: That's right. We were struggling to get the call through and as I remember we had a situation where from Tehran, no news was good news up to a point. They were to call ^{Gholam} [REDACTED] if there was a problem and then they were to call when they got to Reziah that evening. We got a call through to ^{Gholam} [REDACTED] during the day, some 4-5 hours after they left, and we had hoped to check with him about every 2 hours to see if he had heard from them. We got a call through to him at a point when no news was good news, and he hadn't heard from them so we felt a little more comfortable. Then from the place they were detained the first night they were successful in getting a call through that in effect, they couldn't tell any details, but the call told us they were okay, really better than they really were. We were fairly comfortable here. We had great

help. The phone company here was great help. A fellow by the name of Ray Johnson had our account with AT&T. He might not want his name in print. We, basically, desperately needed to get a call through and we just couldn't get any progress through normal channels. So, we called Ray and he said, "Well, the only way I could do this would be if you can tell me, without any details, if this is a matter of life and death." And we said, "Absolutely". So, we got a call back from somebody in AT&T in New Jersey or somewhere who said that they understood it was a life and death call and that they were getting about one call an hour through and that includes the White House, CIA and anybody else, and that they would give us one if we really needed it. We said that we did, so they got a call through to us. We understood, after the fact, that there was something like 26 calls completed in 24 hours to Iran from the U.S. and we got two of them. So, the phone company really stuck their neck out to help us.

KF: This is after the call you got through to Ahmad routinely? Did you get one call through to ^{Gholam} [redacted] routinely?

TW: I believe not. They both were on this emergency basis.

KF: So, the first was no news is good news. The second was the code that said they were alright.

TW: I don't believe we knew where they were.

KF: No, because the code would not allow them to say that. The code either said they were okay or either if there was something wrong, there was supposed to be a message which would not be in code. So, in reality they were okay. They

were a little behind schedule, but they were okay because they were in Mahabad. They had been cleared by the authorities in Mahabad and they were spending the night at the Shah's palace. What was the next news you got?

TW: I guess the next excitement that happened here is that Ross had gone to the Consulate in Istanbul and had told them what was happening because we knew the guys would arrive in Turkey without passports and we didn't want to compound the problems we had. So Ross had told the Consulate in Istanbul what was happening and asked for his cooperation. By this time, the State Department had finally realized that we were really right and they were wrong, and they were starting to try to cooperate at this point. Ross gave this information to the Consulate in confidence and with an understanding that it would not be communicated anywhere where it did not have to be, but as things go in the State Department, I guess, the Consulate felt like he had to cover his rear by sending a situation report to the State Department which he did, coded confidential. As it turns out after the fact, this cable was leaked to a reporter for the Dallas Morning News who was the Washington correspondent. We had had already one unfortunate experience with this guy already. At this point he had a source in the State Department that leaked to him the fact that we had the guys and they were in route overland to Turkey. They are, at this point, in route. This was about the time they were spending the first night, I think. They were still in route when we got word the Dallas Times Herald was going to publish a story that they guys were in route.

KF: How did you get word?

TW: They called us, looking for confirmation or denial or additional information on the story.

KF: Do you remember his name?

TW: Robert Dudley, I think. There are some stories in the files with his by-line. We can get his exact name. So, we really went to work down here to try to prevent publishing the story because we felt like we had no idea how quickly they'd make the trip, they could be on the road one day, four days, whatever. We felt like that if the Iranians knew, at least, where they were that they would certainly make an effort to pick them up. They had made efforts so far. So, we tried very hard to prevent them from publishing the story. At this point, we were probably as upset with Ross as anybody because he had so many security problems around the whole thing that our inclination here would have been to not tell anybody. We hadn't told the Embassy in Iran yet that we even knew where the guys were. So, Merv and Tom and I were probably as upset with Ross as we were with anybody at that point for letting information out. So, Tom Luce got involved with us and we met with the publisher and his lawyers. To make a long story short, they went ahead and published the story the next morning.

KF: Oh, they did?

TW: Yes, and fortunately, the guys made it across the border by the time the story was published, but just barely. The story was published that they were in route overland and by the time the paper hit the street they were in Turkey, but it was just a matter of hours. So, if they had gotten detained another night along the way, the story could have made the difference between them getting out and not getting out.

SR: How did the newspaper rationalize printing the story?

TW: I don't know. We did everything to threatening legal action to whatever, but I think the situation in the papers here, at least, is that the business and publication side of the paper and the legal side is willing to exercise very little control over the editorial side of the paper. It was just a story that they had a scoop which they had gotten through illegal means. It is against the law to disclose confidential information out of the State Department. But, anyhow, they had a scoop and they weren't going to give it up. They figured that if they waited until everything was clear then everybody would have it. They had a scoop and they were going to publish it or be damned.

KF: Did somebody here talk to the editor?

TW: Yes. Luce talked to Lee Guittar, the publisher or editor. He either met with or talked to the paper's lawyers. When they got all through, the bottom line was that they published it. We were fit to be tied over that.

This is just a little incident, going back to that Sunday the guys were out. I'll never be able to prove that this was Dudney, but I know it was Dudney. We had been dealing with a fellow named Tom Beard, an aide at the White House, who was one of Mitch Hart's contacts as I mentioned earlier. Beard had been very helpful to us in trying to get some things done. We didn't get any results but his heart was in the right place. I had occasion to talk to Beard several times for various details and I got a call while Ross and Mitch were in route to Washington the Sunday the guys got out of jail. I was called out of a meeting, the secretary called me and said, "I've got Tom Beard from the White House on the phone. Can you talk to him." So, I came out of the meeting. This guy identified himself as Tom Beard and started asking me questions like,

"I understand the guys are out, where are they, when are you going to get them out of the country . . .", and it seemed like a really strange line of questioning. I said, "Let me finish up something and call you back". So, I hung up and called Beard's home and Beard answered the phone, so it had not been Beard that called.

SR: So, you think it was Dudney?

TW: This is kind of off the track. It was a collect call. If it had been Beard calling from home . . . but we didn't stop to think why this guy would be calling collect. Beard was pretty upset about it. Anyhow, later we looked on our telephone bill since it was a collect call, we had the number, and it turned out to be a number out in West Virginia somewhere. We called the number and the lady said, "This has happened before about a call that was supposedly placed from this number", but generally when you call a number collect, you give the operator the number you're calling from so you can give her any number. Anyhow, I will go to my grave convinced it was Dudney. We tried to go back through the telephone company. They kind of froze up. We had some security people from the telephone company tell us we were on the right track, but couldn't go any further unless we got a court order. So, finally, they went away, but I will always believe it was Dudney.

SR: And how did Dudney know you had a connection with Tom Beard?

TW: He was just in Washington snooping around and . . .

KF: My question is, how did he know that they were out?

TW: Well, every prison . . . he knew they were in prison and by Sunday morning, the news was that every prison in Iran had been overrun and he was fishing. He probably didn't know as much as he pretended to know. It just felt bad to me. My first inclination was to talk to him, then I just realized the whole thing didn't hang together very well. He was a bulldog. He hung on this thing from the very beginning. But, anyhow, that's a kind of a nit.

KF: That happened on that Sunday?

TW: That's right. So that was a very tense part of the time out. A lot of our activity for a period of time was trying to keep a lid on the press on this thing to be sure that the people had a chance to get out. Then when all of that group left the country, the people that were left in the country in Joe Poche's group were kind of our problem then because Bill Gayden had dealt with the Embassy people. So, they were there waiting for the evacuation flights. We then turned a lot of our attention to getting those people out.

Going back a minute, before the people actually left Iran and Glenn Jackson was down in Amman . . . Glen was a guy that I really had a high regard for the way he operated. He was on his own. He was the only EDS guy in the country and he was attempting to fly into Tehran with these Arab wings pilots. He had a very vague mission and that was to try to get them out. Glenn's concept was that he was going to fly in on Arab Wings and go to the airport and try to find them and get them back to that airplane which was probably "mission impossible", but Glenn didn't see it that way. Actually, more than one occasion, he got on a plane and flew with them. They were gutsy pilots and their idea every morning was to get up and try to go to Tehran. If they got turned back, they got turned back. If they didn't, they'd land. He never got in there but

it wasn't because he wasn't on the airplane and because the pilots weren't . . .

SR: Who turned them back?

TW: The Iranian fighter aircraft, or they'd have the runway blocked with heavy machinery, or something like that.

KF: In fact, he did it on two occasions and on both times they were turned back to the border by Iranian fighter aircraft.

TW: So, he was really a gutsy guy operating with some gutsy people down there. Then, as the things moved back to the people who were left there, there were a couple of interesting incidents. One is that , of course, Bill Gayden had told where he'd left them, so we knew who was at Lou Gelz's house and what the plan was. By then the State Department had so much egg on their face that they were trying to be helpful at this point in time, in this country, and they were communicating with us some. Lou Gelz was the one bright spot of the U.S. Embassy staff. He was the Counsel General. Lou made a statement to Gayden as I recall that he had been in diplomatic service for years and he had never turned anybody over to another country and he wasn't going to start then and that he would take care of them. So, we were very antsy because Lou chose to have them stay at his house as opposed to the Embassy compound. We thought security-wise they were much safer at the Embassy, but for whatever his reasons were he had them at his house. I really had an interesting phone call. I called Lou's telephone which was through the Embassy switchboard, although his house was several blocks from the Embassy, and got a very hurried, "We're closed for the day"-type message from the switchboard. It was a working day. I scratched my head over it awhile. It turned out I had called in there in the middle of the

take-over of the Embassy. So, fortunately, by the grace of God, our people would have been in that group instead of at Lou Gelz's house when the Embassy was taken that first time. I got hold of Poche later. I think we got a direct number to Gelz's house and everything seemed fine until the day of departure of the evacuation flights. So we worked with the State Department in trying to figure out what the smart thing to do -- get out people on the first flight and get them the hell out of there or to keep them hidden for a little while and wait until things got more routine. By this time the State Department was deferring to us on things like this and we said, "Well, the sooner the better". They'll probably go bananas when they find that these people have gotten out of the country. So we think it's really risky to have our people stay in the country." So, they started the long day of loading up on buses at the Embassy and going to the airport.

KF: That conversation with the State Department was with the State Department in Washington?

TW: Yes

KF: Were you talking to Precht?

TW: I don't remember who . . . I may can dredge that up in notes. Not Precht, I think, but someone in his division. I'll look and see if I can come up with that. So that day we were in communication generally with what was going on there with the State Department and also through Pan American who was running the evacuation flights. I have had some bad impressions from time to time about Pan American as an operator, but they went above and beyond the call of duty in helping the Americans out of Tehran, going back to the original evacuation and everything else. They had the best "can-do" attitude all through the organization.

So we were keeping reasonably abreast of what was going on as the ordeal went on. We had made arrangements with Pan American to verify, once they left Iranian air space, that our people were on board.

KF: Whose idea was that?

TW: I don't know. We had been dealing with Pan American back since December during the evacuation and I was talking to them frequently. I don't really remember whose idea it was.

KF: I have a feeling that I have been told that once they were in the air, Poche went and asked the pilot to call Frankfurt, but it may have been prearranged.

TW: Well, that's true, but Pan American is really not supposed to use their company radio for that type of thing, but they did. We got down to a point where the time of day was running to the point, that there was a very serious questions of whether those evacuation flights would be allowed to leave that day. We knew that the primary hold-up was the search which we assumed was for our people. It was indeed. We finally got a call, maybe an hour before they eventually took off, from the State Department saying that as far as they knew our people were on the flight, and what was holding it up. They asked our advice, or our permission, to go ahead and tell the Iranians that Chaipparone and Gaylord were out of the country. Because they knew the search was for them and they felt like that if they knew they were out of the country that they would call off the search and let the planes leave. The risk was if they didn't, they'd be held there overnight and the exposure of our people would increase. We thought about it and said, "No, let's just stonewall them because we're afraid if you tell them, then they just may go crazy and not let anybody go or whatever. They've got the planes loaded. Let's just stonewall it and see what happens." Sure

enough, nobody told them that our people were out of the country. Finally, right before dark they went ahead and let them take off. Once they cleared Iranian air space, we knew that they were on.

KF: Who was calling Pan Am?

TW: I guess I was.

KF: Who were you talking to there?

TW: I'd have to go back and look. Most of our dealings with Pan American was through their office in Houston. There was a regional marketing-type guy that did most of the things. But they did interesting things. For example, back in the evacuation, we had those people in Turkey, trying to get them on Pan Am from Istanbul back to New York, and they gave out a ticket stock at the station in Turkey. So, there were all these people there and the flight leaving, and no stock to write tickets on. To a bureaucratic organization like an airline, that's a big problem. You're taught from the time to go to work that you don't let people on the airplane if they don't have a ticket, it doesn't matter what the circumstances are, no ticket, no seat. And, this was like a, as I recall, it was a Sunday or a Saturday and we were talking to a supervisor in their reservations center or sub center down in Houston. And, we said, "Look, you know, that can't possibly happen, you know, you cannot let that airplane take off with 300 empty seats when you've got 300 people that need to get out of Turkey." So she said, "Just give me a minute to think about it". So, in about thirty seconds she said, "Okay, I'll tell you what we'll do. We'll board them on the basis of a manifest and we'll write the tickets in NY and once they're in New York, we'll pull the tickets." So this gal, a supervisor

on a weekend shift in Houston, made that decision without, as far as I could tell, contacting anyone else. The whole airline backed her on her decision which was completely contrary to policy. So, it's interesting in going through this . . .

KF: This was the 8th & 9th of December?

TW: Yeah. So, it's interesting how the telephone company, Pan American and people like that who are just people really went to bat with just our promise that we weren't doing anything wrong. They did things way out of their procedures and yet the people we had originally thought would be of help to us, turned out to be completely bogged down in their procedures and preconceived ideas. So, by now, everything is underway. At this point in time, someone here thinks about extradition. We've got everybody landing in Germany and I don't know who raised the question.

KF: I believe it was Simons originally.

TW: Well, it was probably him at that end, but someone at this end, Luce or someone, had raised the question here. So by the time they were on the way, research was being done and determined there was an extradition treaty. So, there were some precautions taken there but everything went pretty smoothly.

KF: Any precautions taken at this end?

TW: No, not really. They were kind of on their own. The quieter and quicker they could get through Germany, that was all we could do there. Any questions we asked just raised the issue over there. Once they got to Frankfurt and got off the ground and were on their way back, we pretty well broke up the operation

here. We were laughing when I started to leave. I told Merv, "You know this thing isn't over yet. We'll go home and get in bed and get a call that they are in the middle of the Atlantic somewhere in a life raft and we'll be back at work." It was a joke, but it turned out to be almost true, when you look at the trouble they had coming back.

KF: So, you were woken up then a couple of hours later.

TW: Yeah, I don't really remember. By the time we knew they had a problem, they were safely in London and we started working to get them alternate plans back here. They had planned to land in Washington and pick up Bill Gaylord's family, refuel and come on in here. So we had to get them space on the Braniff flight back and get Gaylord's family from Washington down here. Had to get space arranged at the airport, etc. which the Braniff vice-president helped us with. So that was kind of the end of it.

KF: OK. Were you involved in the lawsuit?

TW: Yeah, to some degree, but I didn't testify or anything like that. I was involved in the preparation for it.

KF: What about the wrangling over that plane. There was some question of responsibility for the damage to that chartered plane.

TW: Well, when we chartered the plane, we were somewhat under duress. That was the only plane we could find available. So, we were somewhat at their mercy. They required us to put up the money before they ever released ahead of time to cover the whole trip, as I recall, was about $\frac{1}{4}$ million dollars. They quoted a rate,

an hourly rate for the plane in the air, a rate on the ground, all of which was to be used against the \$250,000, and we would get back any excess. So, of course, when the plane was not able to be used on the return trip, we had not used anything like the \$250,000 credit. The second thing is that in the cool light of day a little bit later when we had a chance to do some comparables of what charter rates were, we were grossly overcharged for the 707. There's a certain element of the law that says if you are a supplier of a service, you know what the service is worth, whereas the person is buying it has no expertise and he's at your mercy. There's some basis for the legal remedy if you've just simply been had because you had no knowledge and depended on the person you were buying from to warrant the product to be somewhat usable and somewhat reasonable in price. So, we really had two complaints. One we had not been able to get the use of the plane as we had expected. Secondly, they had really taken us to the cleaners on the price, but we were in no position to haggle when we chartered it. We went after them on both scores and we settled before we went to court. I don't remember, but we ended up getting about half of the \$250,000. Tom Luce actually handled it.

KF: OK.

TW: The big lawsuit still grinds on and on.

KF: And you still haven't got paid.

TW: That's right, but we're in much better shape than any other company in the U.S. We're happy to be where we are. We are where we are on that because Tom Luce took such an aggressive position in getting that money bound and attached. Other companies were a little lazy, but he really went after it and was

aggressive and therefore we got a position that no other company has. A 100% tribute to his aggressiveness and vision on how to attack that problem.

KF: Finally, just tell me a little bit about yourself. Tell me when and where you were born.

TW: I was born in 1933 in Selma, Alabama. I grew up mostly in Alabama. My father was in the Air Force during WWII, so we moved around within the U.S.

KF: What's your birthdate?

TW: December 12, 1933.

KF: What rank did your father have in the Air Force?

TW: I guess he was a Captain.

KF: And his name?

TW: John T. Walter

KF: Did you have brothers and sisters?

TW: No.

KF: Where did you go to college?

TW: Auburn University in Auburn, Alabama. My undergraduate degree was engineering physics. I went to school on a Naval ROTC scholarship. As soon as I finished

college I was obligated for three years of service in the Navy. I requested a small combatant ship in the Atlantic fleet, which I got. I went aboard a destroyer in Norfolk for two years, that's where I first met Ross. He had just finished his tour on the destroyer and was leaving when I came aboard. So, I did two years there and had one year to go and extended one year to do a two year tour in the Navy Nuclear Weapons program. I spent two years in Albuquerque, New Mexico for that. Got out and came with Texas Instruments here in Dallas in 1959 and worked there for less than two years.

KF: As an engineer?

TW: Yes, circuit design engineer and meantime, at the University of New Mexico and SMU, I had done most of the course work for a masters in electrical engineering, but I never got around to finishing it all up. But I got interested in computers when I worked at TI. We were doing a lot of circuit design in related areas. I realized I was more interested in how they were used than how they were built. Ross was living here in Dallas and was with IBM at the time. He suggested if that was what I wanted to do, why didn't I talk to IBM because that's where the action was in that area and they had a real good training program. So I talked to IBM and like what they had to offer and went to work for IBM in their training program here in Dallas. They gave me a lot of latitude in what I did when I got out because I'd done very well in the training program. They gave me a choice of where I wanted to go. Jean and I had been away from the southeast for a long time and decided we'd like to go to Atlanta. IBM moved us to Atlanta and I was there with IBM for about two years. Ross started EDS and contacted me about going with EDS, but I was tied up on something I really wanted to finish up with IBM. Then, when I finished that up I came out and talked with EDS and came to work here. I was a systems engineer, but I really came as a project

manager on one of our, I guess it was our second major customer, a life insurance account. So I started as a project manager on my first life insurance account.

KF: What's your official title now?

TW: I'm the Chief Financial Officer of EDS. I have responsibility for all of the administrative and financial areas and am fortunate to have Paul Chiapparone working for me. He handles a great deal of it and several people in the organization that work directly for me, but Paul is responsible for 65-70% of the people that are in my organization. I've known Bill and Paul for a long time.

KF: I think that's it.