

HOTFOOT -15  
INTERVIEW WITH TOM LUCE  
November 4, 1981

KF The first question I have is a contradiction between what you said and what Bill Gaylord said. You said a formal letter was delivered to the Ministry in Iran, terminating the EDS contract on December 4, 1978. Bill says that a final notice was delivered on November 14, effective December 14.

TL I think both are correct. As I recall, and I could double-check it. I think what happened was that we, as lawyers, got involved in the project in late November, early December, after EDS by itself, had written that November 14 letter. And I think that John Howell and I completed, that we would always want to content that the November 14 letter was sufficient. But, we as lawyers -- there was some clean-up things -- and we wanted to write another one on December 4, and we delivered another letter on December 4, all the while maintaining we've done all the proper steps on the 14th. I think that's what accounts for the discrepancy.

KF Okay. It sounds like the usual xx wearing belts and braces.

TL Yes, that's correct.

KF Okay.

TL I had not heard that expression in this country, but I think I know what you mean.

KF Okay, moving on a bit. Now, this is before Bill and Paul are arrested. You pursued a number of contacts who you gave me xx, xx, and xx. And you say that all you could discover was that the EDS contract was a hot potato. Can you tell me who said exactly what to you during this time; where the information came from -- first, where the information came from; second, elaborate a bit on this hot potato idea.

TL Okay. First of all, I probably, my information with some of those lawyers was second-hand, in that John Howell was actually in Iran talking to them and John and I would talk at night by telephone and maybe on some of them -- for instance,

TL John met personally with John Westburg and Matindactre and I did not. So, I was relying on what John Howell told me. It is my clear recollection, though, that I believe that both Westburg and Matindactre said the same thing about hot potato, political issue or something to that effect. I did meet with Agion myself, in New York, and Agion in effect told me -- I think he used the words that EDS contract had a high visibility; that it had been a contract which had been front-page news in the sense of not the EDS aspect, but that the Ministry was automating, was going to computers -- it had high visibility. For that reason, everyone was proceeding cautiously because there was a sense that . . . it was because of this high visibility everybody was going to proceed with caution because it had been, in effect, an unannounced big program of the Government.

KF You mean, the Iranians would proceed with caution?

TL Yes. Because, I think you have to keep in mind, in December -- was very much a time frame when nobody knew who was running the country. And I think the caution emanated from the Iranian side -- well, they didn't know whether to get out and xx the contract or, yeah, phase the contract -- because nobody knew who was going to end up in control. That was the sense that I had during this time period is that everybody was very cautious, and I think Iran is a country that's . . . there's a great deal of conspiracy, paranoid type reaction and nobody knew who was going to be the power and nobody wanted to be ahead of events; everybody wanted to be behind events, not ahead of them.

KF Got it.

TL How in the world do you keep doing this all day long? Don't you wear down?

KF Not yet, but I've only been doing it two and a half days. Now we move to December 28. How did you learn that they'd been arrested?

TL I was called at home -- I believe by Tom Walter. It's my recollection, I think it was at night. I have a recollection that there was a terrible sleet storm here in Dallas and I remember driving very slowly on Forest Lane, receiving a

TL telephone from Tom and could I come down. That's my recollection.

KF Okay. So you came here to EDS. And who did you meet with here?

TL I believe Tom Walter. I think Tom Marquez and I think Merv Stauffer. That sticks in my mind. For some reason, I don't recall Bill being here, but he might have been.

KF So what decisions did you make? How did you decide to proceed from that point?

TL Well, I have a sense that the man said if everybody was . . . let's be thinking about what can be done while Ross is coming back to Dallas. I remember kind of having the feeling that we don't want to march into it until Ross got back. I had the sense that what we were doing that night was trying to understand from Tehran exactly what had happened, what had been said -- more like, let's make sure we have all the facts before we meet with Ross. And, I somehow recall that Marquez had said something like he had to talk to Ross, Ross was on his way back and we ought to be getting together and deciding what we would recommend be done.

KF And what was your recommendation?

TL Well, I can't recall everybody's. I feel pretty certain that what I recommended was, starting on two aisles, one was to see what help we could get in Washington and number two, for us to see what help we could get through what I would characterize as the Iranian legal system, or through Iranian xxx, although I was not singing about the latter because of the frustration that I had felt in the December 4 - 28 time frame. In effect, I had seen how difficult it had been.

KF Okay. Now, through a contact in New York, you got to Mattimex, Council at the xx, what was Vance at that point?

TL Secretary of State. So, in effect, Nimmitz was the lawyer to Sy Vance.

KF What was Kissinger? This isn't particularly your province; what was Kissinger

at that point?

TL Kissinger was not a Government official. He was very prominent, of course, and still is. He was a private citizen.

KF Because Ross phoned Kissinger at some point.

TL Yes he did. Ross, as I recall, in that time frame kind of said to me -- he wanted me to begin to think and list the, what I'll characterize as the political or governmental contacts that he could make, to start thinking of people. I think I actually mentioned Kissinger to Ross, I'm not positive of that. Throughout this time, this entire time period Ken, I think Ross and I worked hand in hand on the political side, I say Tom Walter and I in this sense. We were constantly coming to Ross and saying, "Ross, here's where we are, here's what we're about," and, there were many people that it would always be better for Ross to make the initial telephone call than for me to make the initial telephone call. Henry Kissinger is going to take Ross' telephone call; he's not going to take my telephone call.

KF Okay.

TL So, I . . . I would say there'd be lots of cases we'd come to Ross and say, "Ross, we think we ought to contact Bob Strauss, and we think you ought to make the initial contact." He'd say, "Fine," and he'd call Strauss and somehow during the conversation he'd say to Strauss, "Now, Tom Luce is working on the problem for me," and that would give me the introduction to Strauss that I would need to carry on thereafter with Strauss.

KF You managed to get a note sent to Vance. Although you managed to get a cable sent under Vance's name to the Embassy in Tehran.

TL I got Nimmitz to deliver a personal to Vance and then I got Nimmitz to send out a cable under Vance's name to the Embassy.

KF What was Helms position at the moment? Was he a private citizen?

TL He was a private citizen. He was a former head of the CIA and a former Ambassador to Iran.

KF So, he had good contacts in Tehran.

TL At this time, we were very much in a mentality that said we need to throw a lot of bread upon the water. We don't know who ultimately would be able to help, but by God, let's try everybody.

KF Who knew Helms?

TL Ross.

KF Okay.

TL And Ross again made the initial contact to Helms and said he had a problem and he wanted to send Tom Luce and Tom Walter to come see him. And then Walter and I actually went and visited with Helms. But Ross, I'm positive, made the initial telephone call.

KF Okay. You contacted Admiral Moorer who was again a contact of Ross'.

TL Yes. A former chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs -- top military officer in the country. He had extensive contacts with the Iranian Military.

KF Okay. I don't want to jump ahead, but you said that you went to Washington to see Helms. When was that?

TL I went to Washington to see Helms, the first time, prior to the time Paul and Bill were arrested.

KF Oh. Oh, I see, right. Okay. Yes, and I have that. Okay. December 29, you wrote a summary of the situation which you xxxx.

TL Yeah. I don't want to glorify that. Basically, what we found was that anytime we'd meet with somebody, it kind of was a normal reaction to say, "I've enjoyed meeting with you and I understand you've got a problem -- by the way, can you leave me a little memo that -- what they were really fishing for -- they wanted to make sure they spelled Paul's name right, Bill's name right and they wanted a little factual memo that could be left behind that would outline the situation to them and then glorify this xx paper of xx.

KF On December 30, you began to encounter what you felt to be open resistance from the Iranian lawyers. Westburg's Iranian partners objected in taking the case because it was too dangerous. Is this this political hot potato thing again?

TL Yes. . . I think, and I have a chronology of the political events in mind here that I can double check, but I believe I'm correct that on December 29, which was the day after Paul and Bill were arrested, politically there was a change in Iran and Barzigan became appointed the Prime Minister by the Shah and that was taken as a manifestation of the folder weakening of the Shah's grip because Barzigan had been a, at a minimum, a moderate and many characterized him as a leader of the liberal elements in Iran. Certainly not a left-wing but kind of a liberal person who was not "One of the Shah's long standing friends." And it was a move by the Shah to indicate a degree of moderation and flexibility. But, it seemed it had already had an affect on our lawyer friends in Iran who were already kind of going like that and trying to see which way the winds were blowing. It kind of was a Well, we're not so sure the Shah's going to be around and everybody, I think, kind of backed a further knotch away. That's my assessment of what was happening.

KF December 29 you were advised that the State Department had received it's first report from the Embassy. Who gave that information?

TL It had to be Henry Prect.

KF Who's he?

TL A fellow xxx.

KF This is the first time his name has been mentioned to me.

TL Henry Prect, to me, is a very central character is my aspect of the, of this whole episode. Henry Prect was what they call at the State Department, the

Head of the Iranian Desk. That is to say, the person in this country who had responsibility for State Department failures with the country of Iran. So, within the bureaucracy, the political levels where Sy Vance comes in or David Newsom, but at the working level, Henry Prect was the highest ranking person with responsibility to the country of Iran. And therefore, he was the central point of contact for me within the State Department and Prect was, well, I don't where to start. First of all, and I suspicioned at the time and I think subsequent xx reports, etc. had demonstrated, that Henry Prect was leading an element within the State Department and prime xx, pushing the view that the United States ought to back away from the Shah and that the -- what we ought to be doing was lining ourselves with Khomeini. And Henry Prect, for instance, who told me that Khomeini was a moderate and it was very clear to me that Prect also had a rather belligerent attitude regarding American business in Iran, in the Middle East. I felt like that most of the time we had to defend ourselves and that we had done much more than any demonstrated concern about the fact that Paul and Bill had any xx.

KF Do you think the State Department people suspected that there had been some corruption in the EDS contract?

TL Well, they didn't suspect there had been in the EDS contract. They didn't know their ass from their elbow about the EDS contract, but they had a mind set, they had a mentality that said all American business in the Middle East was corrupt, everybody was planting bribes, and if so facto, therefore, the EDS contract was corrupt and what is happening to you guys, you deserve. And, I am totally convinced that was their mind set.

KF Do you think most . . . you're not the expert on this . . . do you think it's true most businesses were paying bribes in Iran?

TL I don't know. But I knew this and it's what I spent most of my time fighting. I knew that we weren't and I knew that, in the first place, Ken, I think you have to keep in mind in an historical perspective, there was a big flap in this country about something called foreign corrupt practices act, which was a piece of legislation passed by legislation. In this country, we prohibit Americans from paying bribes in another country. And, EDS had never done business overseas

until after that act passed. You have to keep in mind, the EDS contract in Iran was the first major contract EDS had done.

KF Abroad.

TL Abroad. So . . .

KF Do you remember when that act was passed?

TL As I recall, it was in Congress when I was negotiating the 76 contract and it came almost on the heels of it. As a matter of fact, I think maybe the contract was signed shortly before the act became effective, but when we knew that was the law. And, as a matter of fact, I recalled xxx that in the 76 congressional hearings, I believe it was the Locke Heed Chairman of the Board had been called before the Senate to testify and frankly, I think, he was made to look like a jerk and I remember Perot calling me into the office and saying, "Now, when you do this contract in Iran, I want you to make sure that I'd never have to look like that before any Congressional body and we are not going to do that overseas. And, I'm holding you responsible." Because I was the lawyer in charge of the contract and he said, "I want you to make absolutely certain that we comply, not only comply with the law, but that I'll not end up in Washington someday looking like that guy." And I said, "Look," . . . I don't care, and I don't care what you monkeys think Lockheed did, Boeing did xx did, what anybody did, we didn't". And, we didn't go overseas until after this whole era had changed and we didn't and our people are being held and you ought to get off your butt and do something. But, I was met with enormous amount, I'd say the other attitude I confronted, you can tell I'm still frustrated by it; it still makes me mad. I was confronted by a great deal of what I characterize is, "Oh, you're being naive. You know, if Iran wouldn't do this, just work through the system -- I was very frustrated by what was happening and I looked at Henry Prect as the principal opponent of that.

KF How do you spell his last name?

TL Precht.



KF Okay.

TL Although, from time to time, I called him prick.

KF Just to go back to the business of bribery for a moment . . .

TL By the way, I do remember one thing. I remember how we move, how we did . . . and this is not in our memo. When the men were arrested, we tried to call Henry Precht and we could not get through to him. And, Bill Gayden finally left a message with Henry Precht's secretary that said, "We're going to hold a press conference in one hour if we'd not heard from Henry Precht, to announce that our men had been arrested and they were arrested following State Department advice, and Precht better phone us back within an hour. And Precht did. And that's how we first met Henry Precht. That's how we got off with Henry Precht.

KF Okay. Just to go back to the business of bribes for a moment. I would suspect that even without the foreign practices act, Ross might have given you those instructions on foreign contracts.

TL Oh, it's very clear he would have. I'm just saying that I remember and I remember . . .

KF It just seems to me, not, not in his personality.

TL Yeah. And it was very clear, I mean, he not only, he made clear that he wasn't looking to me for the law. He was saying, "I want you to make sure." And, you know, and I'm sure from time to time, I offended a few people working on the EDS contract, you know, I questioned the hell out of them. Because this was the first international contract and he'd made it very abundantly clear to me that he didn't want any problems and he didn't care at level of the company. He wanted me to know that he was looking to me to make sure that didn't happen.

KF Okay. And since you didn't have any particular incentive to sell, you were not in any way . . .

TL That's right. I wasn't making the rules. And he was saying "I'm looking to you".

KF You met Precht on December 30. You and Tom Walter. And you told me. Okay, I have details of that. You ended up at some point during the next 14 days, perhaps even right back there on December 30. You all realized that you were not going to get much help from the State Department.

TL Yeah, but let me say this. I probably was the last one to give up on that. I'm sure Ross gave up a whole lot sooner than I did. I was a leader in the view internally that we could make it happen either through the Iranian legal system or through Washington and that if we would just stay after it, just be imaginative enough, try enough things, we would find a way to get done that way. I ultimately was proven totally wrong, but I was the proponent of that viewpoint. Way past the time that Ross felt that there was any hope to get it done that way.

KF At what point did you learn about Col. Simons and that operation?

TL Well I never learned about it officially. Ross never told me about the Col. Simons operation.

KF You must have started guessing at some point.

TL But I felt it was best, given what I was supposed to be doing, that I not know about it and I never asked. I think Ross on purpose did not discuss it with me. I remember expressing internally, I can't remember whether to Ross, that we ought to proceed down the path I was on as long as was humanly possible. Till we were absolutely that that route wouldn't work. I just refused to believe that we couldn't get something done in Washington.

KF How many Texas congressmen are there?

TL 22 or 23 or 24

KF Who contacted Rosalyn Carter?

TL As I recall, we arranged for Emily Gaylord to do that. Isn't that Bill's wife's name; I can't remember her name. That was not done by me personally, I believe that happened through either Ted Kennedy's office or Ted Kennedy's office to Bill Gaylord's wife. We tried to make that a wife to wife type of contact.

KF And of course all these people you contacted ended up calling Henry Precht.

TL I wasn't smart enough to figure that out, but in hindsight, it's a very normal thing. What happens is you go to a Senator with a problem. He wants to do something; he wants to demonstrate to you that he has done something. So as soon as you leave, he picks up the damn telephone, calls the State Department. That's his logical place to call -- Foreign Affairs, State Department. He picks up the telephone, he calls someone that they call Aid for Congressional Affairs in the State Department and the guy says "what's the problem Senator?". And as soon as he finds out that it's dealing with Iranian affairs, he says "well, fine Senator, I'll have Henry Precht call you". And the Congressional aide sends the message down to Henry Precht "make damn sure you call Sen. Kennedy today". So what finally dawned on me was all of this ruckus we created was funnelling down to one person.

KF And on January 19, Henry Precht called who? You? And he said "I surrender; call off the dogs".

TL Yeah. As I recall, he started off mad, but then kinda said "Okay, I surrender." He was more like "Goddammit, if you'd get off my back, I could get something done". I said "well, Henry, you haven't and I'm not". And then he said something like 'I surrender; call off the dogs'. But he came in real mad that dammit, you're causing everybody in the United States of American to call me. I said, "Yes, you're quite right. I take great credit for that. That's what we're trying to do, Henry". But stop and think about it a minute. It took until January 19 for that to happen. That's a long time when you've got two men sitting in jail. It's a long time when you're in jail. And it's a long time when you're facing Ross Perot, too. He wants to know what the hell you are doing? What do you mean the State Department had you call so and so? Paul and Bill are sitting in jail. What are you doing?

KF Don't tell me what you tried; tell me what you've achieved.

TL That's right. And I had achieved nothing.

KF So you were pretty damn frustrated. On Saturday, the 28th of January, Precht called the U. S. Embassy. How did you know that? Did he tell you that?

TL He told us he called our lawyer in Washington at home on Saturday afternoon and told him...

KF Who's your lawyer in Washington?

TL We retained a firm called Steptoe and Johnson because one of their partners whose name was Monroe Lee, and he was considered a very noted international lawyer who had been the chief legal advisor in the State Department under the Nixon administration. He was a well-known Washington figure. We retained him for his contacts in the State Department.

KF So Precht called him and I presume Lee called you. Is that L-E-E?

TL No, it's L-E-I-G-H. And his partner, Mike Sandler. I think it was actually Mike who called me, not Monroe that particularly weekend. Although both of them were on the phone.

KF Did you see the report back from the Embassy?

TL Which report?

KF That Precht had asked for. Precht asked for concrete suggestions and you say the report made all the efforts appear fruitless. The Embassy's only suggestion was to continue negotiations.

TL Ken, I don't remember. I can check that.

KF If you have a copy of it, I would like to see it.

TL What date was that? Give me a date reference. January 19 or 20, somewhere in there?

KF The report was asked for on the January 20. It must be before the 26th. Who is Warren Christopher?

TL Warren Christopher was the number two man in the State Department. Warren Christopher subsequently, unrelated to us, was the man who actually negotiated the hostage release. He's the one who negotiated with Algeria and Iran. He was at that time, and continued to be, the number two man in the State Department under Vance. And then number two under Muskie. Remember Vance resigned and Muskie became Secretary of State. But he was number two man under both men.

KF He's not a civil servant; he's a politician. You met again with Precht. Precht called you. Offered to meet with you. You met him. He said all the government can do is explore ways to help pay the bail. You started working on that.

TL You understand we had been working on it in Iran. I was now starting to find ways that the United States government could help us arrange to pay it. We couldn't get it done through the Iranian banking system.

KF Tell me a bit about that. There was a problem of the guarantee.

TL Well John Howell really worked on it on the Iran end. As I understand part of it was just the Iranian banking system was just collapsing. The banks weren't open; they weren't operating. You'd say, "we'll arrange"...a bank won't issue a letter of credit without something backing it up. We couldn't walk into Iran into the country of Iran and find a way to deliver that much cash. Then you have to say "look, we'll arrange for the bank of America to guarantee this bank, the Iran bank, that the money will be paid". You have to work out how mechanically that's gonna be done. And there wasn't any banking system to do that. Letters of credit in normal times are issued based upon pieces of paper which float back and forth between banks. With just the simple task of getting a letter of credit issued was not easy in those times.

KF So you hoped you couldn't get a letter of credit issued in Iran. You were trying...

TL We thought maybe there was a way to say that United States Embassy would say to the Iranian bank "we will guarantee the letter of credit. Therefore you issue the letter of credit and the United States Embassy will back it up".

KF Because the U. S. Embassy would have a parallel credit note from an American bank.

TL Which would ultimately trace back to us. It always traces back to EDS.

KF You would have paid \$12 million into an American bank...

TL Who then would have guaranteed to the State Department that we would pay. And then the State Department would guarantee to the Iranian bank that we would pay.

KF And that came off. You got that guarantee delivered to the State Department.

TL We got our end of it done. Which was to get it to the State Department.

KF Precht refused to believe...

TL He kept saying "Oh, just get it done in Iran". I talked to him, and then I talked to John Howell at night and say "John, hell, Henry Precht says you ought to be able to get it done in Iran. Why can't you get it done?" And he'd say "What's that yo yo talking about? The banks are closed. What do you mean get the letter of credit in Iran?".

KF So you cut out this article from the New York Times on the 7th of February.

TL In the real world, what he was doing was stalling me. He was jacking me around. That's all he was doing.

KF You continued to meet with people. You met with Ramsey Clark. What was his official position at that point?

TL None.

KF He was a private individual.

TL Ramsey Clark had been a former attorney general of the United States and was noted as being as having turned rather radical after becoming Attorney General. He supported Jane Fonda during the Vietnam War demonstrations. He was very famous proponent of radical causes. And I thought he might have some contacts in Iran.

KF He was Attorney General under...

TL Lyndon Johnson.

KF That long ago? And he still was a prominent figure at this point?

TL Well he's a prominent figure in the sense of prominent in the circles in which he runs. He's not I wouldn't say prominent on the political scene because he'd become so radical. But I thought he might help me. Hell, I didn't care who I talked to. He could be the devil himself if he had contacts with the people I wanted to try to deal with in Iran. That's what I was trying to...you see, the problem was we started off trying to get help from people who had contacts with the Shah's government. What happened was, Ken, we found out really before the United State's government found out that didn't do any good. Henry Kissinger might be able to pick up the telephone and talk to the Shah and have the Shah promise that the men were going to be released. But a country's no different from any other organization. The big cheese says "fine, it will be done" but he's got to run all the way down to the guy who's got to pick up a key, turn the cell door and let two guys out. What was happening was we kept dealing with people who had contacts with the Shah but the Khomeini forces were infiltrating the government from the bottom up. So we found out, really before our government did that we'd been barking up the wrong tree. I'd spent all my time dealing with the Helmses of the world, Admiral Moorers and that group of people. So I finally said to myself, "Hell, I'm chasing after the wrong people". I'm going to go to the Ramsey Clarks of the world who might have some contacts with the Khomeini forces. Because they are really in control. The biggest frustration during this entire time period. I want to get over two points. One: there was no government during most of the time. There was nobody to deal with. Government changed daily, ministers changed daily. There wasn't anybody to deal with. I don't care what you wanted to try to work out. You couldn't work it out because there wasn't a government. We kept trying to tell Henry Precht and he'd say "just go over there and have your lawyers deal with the Government". I'd say, "Henry there isn't a government. There isn't a functioning government. There may be a Shah in power or there may be a Barzigan who's today the Prime Minister; but Henry, I'm telling you, there's no functioning government. And when there is no functioning government, nobody is going to stick their neck out and make a deal to even accept the bail for fear that they will have done something wrong." So one, there was no functioning

and number two: the capturing and the jailing of the two men cut across the spectrum of going all the way from the Shah's government over here to the Khomeini government and what we forget, looking back was; there were several interim staffs. And we went through, in fact, a short course in the Revolution.

KF Am I right in thinking it was Ramsey Clark who was in that jail when Ross walked in?

TL Yes.

KF Any idea why?

TL Yes. He was there to call on an American woman who was jailed for murder.

KF But he was still in no official capacity, I presume. Just helping out. I wonder if he'd gone to Iran just for that or if he was there anyway.

TL I think he was there anyway. I think he was there in effect trying to establish a line of communication or whatever you want to call it. Reaffirm his contact with the Iranian left wing. When I met with the professor, for instance, the James Bill, I was just trying to understand the political forces that were at work in Iran. Because I wanted to see was I missing a bat somewhere. For instance, there was the Shah forces. There were what I'd call the left forces. At that time, they were called the NLF, I think. And they were secular liberals who wanted to change the Shah's....they were people basically concerned with civil liberties. And then you had the religious element. That's still the conflict going on in Iran today. Now what happened was, back in our time, you first went from the Shah, to the left, and then to Khomeini. I was trying to find new roads into all three because nobody knew who was really in control. So I just took the basic approach: hell, I'm gonna try all of them. I'll deal with anybody and talk to anybody. Talking to the professor, I tried to find out who's who; who's who here on the left; who's who over here on the religious side.

KF I don't think we have the professor in here, do we?

TL I think it's in the last paragraph. I think I referred to him, Dr. James Bill, a Mideast scholar.



KF Did he give you names to contact in those various groups? Was he able to do that?

TL He gave me one or two. But he couldn't tell me how to get in touch with them. Totally frustrating. He said "Well you really ought to try this Ayatollah and this Ayatollah". Very funny, by the way, he didn't mention Khomeini. You want to keep in mind, in most of the time period we were dealing in here, Khomeini was not the identifying force. He gave me a bunch of names of some Ayatollahs but he couldn't tell me how to get in touch with them.

KF You talked to an Italian company? How had they gotten their man out?

TL They paid a bribe. The way they characterized it was we applied the Persian solution. They paid a bribe.

KF And what happened to that idea? At this point, I think Ross would prefer to consider a bribe to get these two out.

TL Yeah, again, though, I think Ross kinda avoided that subject around me.

KF So you just reported on the Persian solution.

TL And I gave them the name of the Iranian lawyer who had arranged that bribe. I think somebody in Iran talked to him, and I think the problem was it ended up the guy had been arrested in some....

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